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Abstract 
Genetic testing is becoming more frequent and the results more 
complex. Not infrequently, genetic testing conducted for one purpose 
reveals information about other features of the genome that may be of 
clinical significance. These unintended findings have been referred to as 
“incidental” or “secondary” findings. In 2013, the American College of 
Medical Genetics (“ACMG”) recommended that clinical laboratories 
inform people if their genetic analyses indicate that they have certain 
secondary mutations. These mutations were selected because they 
probably cause a serious disease, which is treatable, and may go 
undetected. The ACMG’s recommendations galvanized critical respon-
ses by the genetics and ethics community. One of the most important 
open questions concerns the scope of negligence liability for clinical 
laboratories if they failed to provide any of these SFs to patients who 
never requested them. To answer this question, this article argues that 
while there might be an ethical or professional obligation to share 
knowledge about these specific genetic mutations, laboratories should 
not be subject to tort liability for failure to share secondary findings 
directly with patients. 
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I. Introduction 
Gone are the days of treating patients based upon their symptoms 
alone. Instead, in a growing number of contexts, physicians prescribe 
treatments based on an individual’s unique genetic information, 
(“genotype.”).1 This is the essence of precision medicine: a bold new 
frontier of innovation in health care where treatments are no longer 
“one size fits all.” It is already standard-of-care for oncologists to order 
a genetic test to determine which chemotherapy to use to treat small-
cell lung cancer.2 If the tumor possesses epidermal growth factor 
receptor (“EGFR”) genetic mutations the cancer is more likely to 
 
1. In contrast, treatment based on “phenotype” or the way a patient’s 
symptoms manifest, has been the traditional, bread and butter of 
medicine. See generally PERSONALIZED MEDICINE COALITION, THE CASE 
FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE, 42 (4th ed. 2014). 
2. Lung Cancer Genomic Testing (EGFR, KRAS, ALK), MEMORIAL SLOAN 
KETTERING CANCER CTR., https://www.mskcc.org/cancer-care/type
s/lung/diagnosis/genetic-testing (last accessed Nov. 9, 2017); What’s New 
in Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer, AM. CANCER SOCIETY, 
https://www.mskcc.org/cancer-care/types/lung/diagnosis/genetic-
testing (last updated May 16, 2016); see generally Federico Innocenti, 
Nancy J Cox & M. Eileen Dolan, Use of Genomic Information to Optimize 
Cancer Chemotherapy 38 SEMIN. ONCOLOGY 186 (2012). 
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respond to a chemotherapy drug called Tarceva.3 It is also common 
to perform a genetic test for human leukocyte antigen before prescribing 
abacavir, an HIV drug, as certain mutations predict adverse reactions 
including death.4 The potential to improve treatments using genetic 
information is enormous. Looking for the next genetic discovery to more 
precisely treat cancers and other life-threatening diseases has resulted 
in a great deal of clinical research.5 
Up until recently, genetic tests were mostly used to confirm the 
diagnosis of disease rather than to guide personalized treatments. 
Traditional genetic tests looked for the presence or absence of muta-
tional “hotspots.”6 Often doctors needed to know what they were 
looking for, and roughly where it was in the genome, and the test would 
tell you whether the disease-causing mutation was present. This is how 
genetic tests for Sickle Cell, Cystic Fibrosis, and many other common 
genetic diseases have worked for decades.7 
This all changed with the advent of next-generation genetic sequen-
cing. One no longer needs to have a needle in mind. Tests can now 
search the entire haystack to see if there is anything of interest 
anywhere. While much is lost in resolution and validity, much is gained 
in scope. So-called “next generation whole genome sequencing,” or 
simply “WGS” can decode three billion base pairs or the complete DNA 
sequence of an organism’s genome with one tissue or blood sample.8 
Sequencing a genome used to be done manually, but the process has 
become more automated and therefore much faster, thus being labeled 
 
3. Yongsheng Wang, Gerlad Schimd-Bindert, & Caicun Zhou, Erlotinib in 
the Treatment of Advanced Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer: An Update for 
Clinicians, 4 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN MED. ONCOLOGY 19, 26 (2011). 
4. Ana Alfirevic and Munir Pirmohamed, Genomics of Adverse Drug 
Reactions, 38 TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCIENCES 100, 101-102 
(2017)[hereinafter Alfirevic]. 
5. ClinicallTrials.gov., U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., https://clinicaltrials.gov 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2018)(search “genetic samples” under “other terms” 
field). 
6. Sara Huston Katsanis & Nicholas Katsanis, Molecular Genetic Testing 
and the Future of Clinical Genomics, 14 NATURE REV. GENETICS 415, 417 
(2013) and see GENEWIZ, https://www.genewiz.com/en/Public
/Services/Next-Generation-Sequencing/Targeted-Resequencing-
Panels/Cancer-Panels/Hot-Spot-Cancer-Panels (last visited Mar. 15, 
2018) (“Hotspot cancer panels target regions of known cancer genes that 
have been well-characterized as mutational hotspots.”). 
7. Id.; Philippa Brice, James Jarrett, & Miranda Mugford, Genetic 
Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: An Overview of the Science and the 
Economics 6 J. CYSTIC FIBROSIS 255, 256 (2007). 
8. Next Generation Sequencing, GENEWIZ, https://www.genewiz.com/en/
Public/Resources/Sample-Submission-Guidelines/Next-Generation-
Sequencing-Sample-Submission-Guidelines (last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
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the “next generation.”9 In humans, this means that the chromosomal, 
and mitochondrial DNA, may be rapidly sequenced.10 When WGS first 
hit the scene, the process was prohibitively expensive so it was only 
used in well-funded laboratories as demonstration projects. But that is 
no longer the case. The price has dropped to about $1500 per sample, 
so WGS is more commonly used in clinical research and treatment.11 
But it is not yet standard-of-care because insurance usually does not 
cover it.12 WGS takes longer than other methods and yields a complex 
range of tricky-to-interpret results. Such results vary from those that 
predict risk for simple Mendelian diseases—caused by single genes—to 
those that implicate common, risk alleles with small effect sizes for 
multi-gene traits (caused by multiple genes).13 
Rather than employing expensive WGS, more clinicians use whole-
exome sequencing as a cheaper and faster alternative.14 Whole exome 
sequencing (“WES”) sequences only exons: the portions of a person’s 
genome that code for proteins or peptides.15 The exons represent only 
two percent of the genome but account for roughly eighty-five percent 
of the mutations that increase the risk of disease.16 Clinical use of WES 
is rising in two contexts: cancer research17 and assisting patients on 
 
9. Sam Behjati and Patrick S. Tarpey, What is Next Generation 
Sequencing?, 98 ARCH. DIS. CHILD EDUC. PRACT. ED. 236, 236 (2013). 
10. See Carla Van El, et al., Whole-Genome Sequencing in Health Care: 
Recommendations of the European Society of Human Genetics, 21 EURO. 
J. HUM. GENET. 580, 582 (2013). 
11. See How it Works, SCIENCE EXCHANGE, https://www.scienceexchange
.com/services/whole-genome-seq (last visited June 28, 2017). 
12. Cigna Issues Coverage Criteria for Whole-Exome Sequencing; WGS Still 
Not Covered, GENOMEWEB (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.genomeweb.co
m/sequencing-technology/cigna-issues-coverage-criteria-whole-exome-
sequencing-wgs-still-not-covered [hereinafter GenomeWeb]; The Cost of 
Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT’L. HUMAN GENOME RES. INST., 
https://www.genome.gov/275651098/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-human-
genome/ (last updated July 6, 2016). 
13. Jason Vassy et al., The Impact of Whole-Genome Sequencing on the 
Primary Care and Outcomes of Healthy Adult Patients, 167 ANN. 
INTERNAL MED. 159, 159 (2017) [hereinafter Vassy]. 
14. GENOMEWEB, supra note 12. 
15. Lauren Westerfield, The Use of Whole Exome Sequencing to Detect Novel 
Genetic Disorders: Two Cases and an Assessment of the Technology, 2 
(2013)(dissertation, University of Pittsburgh). 
16. Julie Steenhuysen, As Sequencing Moves Into Clinical Use, Insurers Balk, 
REUTERS (June 19, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
sequencing-insight-idUSKBN0EU16S20140619. 
17. WES is more common in cancer research, such as The Cancer Genome 
Atlas (TCGA), Stand Up To Cancer (SU2C) and other studies seeking to 
discover genotypes associated with particular tumors. Hanna Rennert et 
al., Development and Validation of a Whole-exome Sequencing Test for 
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diagnostic odysseys.18 If the laboratory finds something interesting 
through WGS or WES, laboratories can, and should, confirm whether 
the result is a false positive or false negative through a more validated, 
targeted genetic test.19 
These next-generation genetic analyses present novel questions for 
ordering physicians and laboratories.20 Because physicians do not need 
to know what to look for before using WGS or WES, physicians can 
cast a wide net. Before, if a child presented symptoms of cystic fibrosis 
(CF), the physician ordered a specific genetic test to confirm whether 
the CF mutation was present. The laboratory took a blood sample, ran 
the cystic-fibrosis test, and confirmed the results.21 But now—with one 
blood sample—the clinical laboratory can scan a genome or exome 
looking for thousands of other mutations.22 Maybe the symptoms are 
caused by something the physician never considered? Maybe there is 
an interesting mutation, but its presence is too rare to say it’s disease-
causing? 
WGS or WES invite a huge data dump. This data dump can come 
in various forms, depending on the way the lab reports its data. It can 
include preliminary information on many diseases for which the patient 
shows no symptoms and which were not related to the reason the 
physician ordered the test.23 Instead of hearing that a child does or does 
not have cystic fibrosis, a parent might also learn that the child is at 
risk for developing early-onset Alzheimer’s or colon cancer. These 
additional mutations are called “secondary findings,” because they are 
 
Simultaneous Detection of Point Mutations, Indels and Copy-number 
Alterations for Precision Cancer Care, 1 GENOMIC MED. 16019, 16019 
(2016). 
18. S.L. Sawyer, Utility of Whole‐exome Sequencing for Those Near the End 
of the Diagnostic Odyssey: Time to Address Gaps in Care, Clinical 
Genetics, 89 CLIN. GENET. 275, 275-284, 279 (2016) (The study, using 
WES had a higher diagnostic rate for Ciliopathy, metabolic and neuro-
developmental disorders, and dysmorphic syndromes.). 
19. Rachel L. Goldfeder et al., Medical Implications of Technical Accuracy in 
Genome Sequencing, 8 GENOME MED. 9 (2016). 
20. For purposes of this paper, I am restricting my analysis to labs that are 
subject to the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 
(CLIA) as they are clinical labs that examine “materials derived from the 
human body for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, 
prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the 
assessment of the health of, human beings.” see 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2017). 
21. Carrier Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., https://w
ww.cff.org/What-is-CF/Testing/Carrier-Testing-for-Cystic-Fibrosis/ 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
22. Clinical Whole Exome Sequencing Information and FAQ, N.Y. GENOME 
CTR., http://www.nygenome.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NYGC-
Clinical-Whole-Exome-Sequencing.pdf, 12 (last updated Jan. 27, 2016). 
23. Id. at 7. 
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discovered incidentally to the primary target of the test.24 While 
secondary findings are possible with all types of genetic testing, they 
are significantly more likely with WES and WGS due to the volume of 
data analyzed.25 
This article addresses whether the tort law of negligence imposes 
any obligation on the laboratory to disclose genetic-risk information 
that is secondary to the primary reason for ordering the test, a 
“secondary finding” or (SF).26 Whether there is a legal duty to warn is 
a threshold question for the judge to apply to similar future cases. Thus, 
before answering case-specific questions about whether there is a breach 
of the standard of care or whether the breach actually and proximately 
caused the patient’s injury, there must be a duty. This article will 
proceed in two parts. First, it introduces the topic and the professional 
obligations imposed by the American College of Medical Genetics 
(“ACMG”). Second, it discusses the common-law factors courts 
routinely use when deciding whether to impose an affirmative duty to 
warn. The article argues against imposing this kind of duty on clinical 
laboratories. 
II. Much Depends on How the Complaint is Framed 
Whether a judge will find that the laboratory has a particular duty 
will depend a great deal on how the patient frames his or her complaint. 
What sort of duty is being alleged? Is the plaintiff arguing that the 
defendant acted carelessly, or that the defendant did not act at all? 
These distinctions matter a great deal and make it impossible to answer 
the question of liability in the abstract. The outcome also depends on  
24. Secondary findings are not new to medicine. Analogous scenarios have 
developed in radiology and pathology, where clinicians discovered tumors 
and disease that were adjacent to the region of primary interest. Clinical 
Sequencing Exploratory Research, Medically Actionable or Secondary or 
Incidental Results, AM. SOC’Y OF HUM. GENETICS, https://www.as
hg.org/education/csertoolkit/medicallyactionable.html (last visited Mar. 
1, 2018).See also Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for 
Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exam and Genome 
Sequencing, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 565, 568 (2013) (“In clinical exome and 
genome sequencing, there is potential for the recognition and reporting of 
incidental or secondary findings unrelated to the indication for ordering 
the sequencing but of medical value for patient care.”). 
25. Madhuri Hegde et al, Reporting Incidental Findings in Genomic Scale 
Clinical Sequencing – a Clinical Laboratory Perspective, 17 J. MOLECULAR 
DIAG. 107, 109-10 (2015). 
26. The ensuing factors and analysis could be applied to a mutation of 
uncertain present clinical value, “dubbed a variant of unknown 
significance” or (VUS), but this will not be the focus of this paper. This 
article relates to the question of imposing a tort duty to disclose the 
results, and the analysis of returning VUS hinges more on the analysis of 
breach, and whether return of these types of results falls below the 
standard of care for laboratories. 
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whether the plaintiff has brought a wrongful-death claim or a “lost 
chance” claim, for the loss of a better clinical outcome, because a 
medical diagnosis was delayed. Courts treat each type of negligence 
differently depending on the alleged duty and injury. Because this 
article seeks to provide practical, concrete guidance to judges, it will 
address a particular question: whether a laboratory should have 
disclosed a mutation directly to the patient. While some fact-specific 
questions arise in this context, a proper analysis of duty should proceed 
more in-abstractly, without wading too deep in the particulars of any 
case. 
This article envisions one a very narrow type of duty-to-warn claim 
where the patient sues the laboratory for not providing SFs to the 
patient, and as a result, the patient failed to pursue a clinical inter-
vention that they would have otherwise taken had they known of the 
genetic risk. If the laboratory returns some SFs to the plaintiff, but 
provides substandard information about the clinical significance of 
those findings, then this event might be framed as a more traditional 
negligence claim and the operative question will be whether the lab 
breached its duty by falling below the standard of care. The defendant 
acted in disclosing the SF, but just did not act appropriately. 
In any negligence action, the plaintiff states in her complaint what 
exactly the breach of the duty was and how performance of this duty 
would have prevented the injury for which she seeks compensation. She 
must prove each of four elements—duty, breach, causation, and 
injury—to prevail.27 In some cases, a duty to contact or warn might be 
imposed because it requires little of defendants.28 In the context of 
genetic sequencing, a plaintiff might allege that the lab has a duty to 
send all genetic-testing results, including those from exome sequencing, 
to the ordering provider. But if imposing this duty is unlikely to prevent 
the harm the plaintiff suffered from a delayed diagnosis—because, for 
example, there is evidence that the physician would not understand or 
use the information to change the patient’s treatment in a way that 
would have prevented her injury—then a breach of this duty cannot 
have caused plaintiff’s harm.29 Each of the elements of a negligence 
claim must align with one another, such that the duty imposed, if 
 
27. See Blue Ridge Service Corp of VA v. Saxon Shoes, 624 S.E.2d 55, 62 
(Va. 2006). 
28. PETER M. GERHART, TORT LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY, 133-134 (2000). 
29. Assuming there is a duty, to see how causation operates in these types of 
cases, see, Kaffka v. N.Y. Hosp., 228 A.D.2d 332, 333 (1996) (“Expert 
testimony that Dr. Minick delayed diagnosis of cancer does not establish 
causation when uncontested evidence shows that, by the time of his 
examination, Mrs. Kaffka’s cancer had already metastasized to the bone 
and liver, tragically sealing her fate.”). 
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performed up to the standard of care, would have likely prevented the 
particular injury alleged.30 
III. The American College of Medical Genetics Report 
As soon as the inevitability of SFs emerged with next-generation 
sequencing, scholars began asking what obligations physicians, 
laboratories, and researchers might have to report these findings to 
patients and their relatives.31 Researchers have suggested that there 
might be ethical—and perhaps legal—duties to warn patients of 
particular mutations, specifically if the mutations are known to be 
disease-causing (“pathogenic”), are quite likely to develop (“highly 
penetrant”), and effective treatments are available (“clinically action-
able”). While amendments to the HIPAA Privacy Rule clarified that 
research subjects can request raw sequencing research results from 
CLIA-certified clinical laboratories,32 the question remains about 
whether the labs might have an affirmative obligation to provide SFs 
to patients, or research subjects, who never affirmatively requested 
them. 
In 2013, a working group of the ACMG published a much-
anticipated list of fifty-six SFs that clinical diagnostic laboratories 
performing exome or genome sequencing should report to patients.33 The 
working group—comprised of sixteen clinical lab directors and 
respected geneticists—explicitly avoided making legal recommendations  
30. See Robert F. Schopp and Michael R. Quattrocchi, Tarasoff, the Doctrine 
of Special Relationship, and the Psychotherapist’s Duty to Warn, 12 J. 
PSYCHIATRY & L.13, 16 (1984). 
31. See Catherine Gliwa and Ben Berkman, Do Researchers Have an 
Obligation to Actively Look for Genetic Incidental Findings?, 13 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 32, 35-36 (2013); see Holly Tabor et al., Genomics Really Gets 
Personal: How Exome and Whole Genome Sequencing Challenge the 
Ethical Framework of Human Genetics Research, 155 AM. J. MED. 
GENETICS 2916, 2924 (2011); see Wylie Burke, et al., Recommendations 
for returning genomic incidental findings? We need to talk!, 15 GENETICS 
IN MED. 854, 854-57(2013); Joon-Ho Yu et al., Attitudes of Genetics 
Professionals Toward the Return of Incidental Results from Exome and 
Whole-Genome Sequencing, 95 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 77, 84 (2014) 
[hereinafter Yu 2014]; Susan M. Wolf, Jordan Paradise, and Charlisse 
Cagaanan, The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research, 
36 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 361, 362-63, 365 (2008). 
32. 45 C.F.R. §493.1291 (2016). HHS’s amendments to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) Privacy Rule and 
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) 
regulations require laboratories in HIPAA covered entities that process 
research results to provide the results to research subjects upon request. 
33. See Green RC, et al., American College of Medical Genetics and 
Genomics. ACMG recommendations for reporting of incidental findings 
in clinical exome and genome sequencing. 15 GENET MED 565, 570 (2013) 
[hereinafter Green]. 
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and instead emphasized that the guidance was meant as an “educat-
ional resource for medical geneticists and other health care providers to 
help them provide quality medical genetic services.”34 Professional 
guidelines can inform legal standards, and so this report renewed 
interest in whether there might also be tort liability for failure to 
provide certain SFs to patients. While the initial ACMG report 
recommended disclosing SFs even when the DNA samples came from 
children35 and where the patients expressed no interest in learning this 
information, the ACMG later changed the recommendation to permit 
patients to opt out of being given their results.36 
The working group focused on the low-hanging fruit.37 Quite sen-
sibly, it limited its recommendation to the mutations that were simplest 
to interpret and classify: single-gene mutations known to increase the 
risk of developing serious disease.38 It deferred answering whether there 
might be an obligation to return results that are less predictable and 
more ambiguous. In addition to being amenable to preventative clinical 
measures or treatment, other factors weighed in favor of disclosure in 
the ACMG report, for example, that the mutations were: highly 
penetrant, known to be pathogenic, verifiable by other diagnostic 
methods, somewhat more common than other monogenic disorders, and 
had clinical presentations that meant they otherwise might escape 
detection for long periods of time.39 
Applying these criteria, based on clinical guidance and some 
emerging data, the working group initially decided that fifty-six SFs 
should be disclosed. The report acknowledged that the list should be 
curated as we gather more population and risk data.40 Specifically, the 
 
34. See id. 
35. One thing that the ACMG recommendations got right from a tort duty 
perspective is that legally it makes no difference whether the samples came 
from kids or adults. If the risk of harm from not disclosing is foreseeable, 
then the lab would have a duty that would extend to children. See 
Foreseeable Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.us
legal.com/f/foreseeable/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
36. Green, supra note 32, at 569. 
37. One thing that the ACMG recommendations got right from a tort duty 
perspective is that legally it makes no difference whether the samples came 
from kids or adults. If the risk of harm from not disclosing is foreseeable, 
then the lab would have a duty that would extend to children. See 
Foreseeable Law and Legal Definition, supra note 35. 
38. Green, supra note 32, at 569. 
39. The ACMG working group did not recommend reporting variants of 
unknown significance (VUS), as they “recognized the challenge of 
attempting to report and interpret variants of unknown significance as 
incidental findings.” See id. 
40. See Sarah Kalia et al., Recommendations for Reporting of Secondary 
Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 2016 Update 
(ACMG SF v2.0): A Policy Statement of the American College of Medical 
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list will change as we gain information on genetic “penetrance,” or the 
percentage of people who have a gene variant who go on to express or 
develop the associated disease.41 Much of the data upon which the 
ACMG recommendations were based relied on case reports where the 
individual was already symptomatic (e.g., the individual was already 
experiencing signs of the disorder).42 When laboratories start providing 
SFs on samples that were tested primarily for something else, and for 
individuals who had not yet developed any symptoms of the SF-linked 
disease, then it is expected that penetrance will be much lower. Many 
of the people who test positive for the mutation will therefore never go 
on to develop the disease (or, “phenotype”).43 Because high penetrance 
was a key factor leading the ACMG to include a particular mutation 
on its list, the ACMG might need to remove mutations from the list 
where the likelihood of an asymptomatic person developing the disease 
is quite low. 
Given the rapid pace of genetic discovery, it is not surprising that 
just three years after its publication the original 2013 report has already 
been amended.44 This second report has been referred to as “ACMG SF  
Genetics and Genomics, 19 GENETICS IN MEDICINE 249, 253-54 (2017) 
[hereinafter Kalia] (“We anticipate that the increasing availability of large 
population databases, such as the Exome Aggregation Consortium 
(ExAC), will be helpful in refining estimates of penetrance, which may 
inform future curation of the ACMG SF v2.0 list” . . . incorporation of 
pharmacogenomic (PGx) variants onto a SF minimum list has also been 
considered [but rejected] . . . due to a lack of randomized, controlled trials 
and small numbers of patients for whom PGx results are available.”). 
41. As some of the data supporting foreseeability of harm relied on case 
reports where the phenotype was already present in the individual, it’s 
possible that penetrance might be lower in individuals whose samples were 
tested primarily for something else (and who had not yet developed the 
disease). Put differently, there might be high false positives for individuals 
with some of these mutations who will never develop the related diseases. 
See LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 39 (National Academy Press, 1994). 
42. Joel Zlotogora, Penetrance and Expressivity and in the Molecular Age, 5 
GENETIC MED. 347, 252 (2003). 
43. David Cooper et al., Where genotype is not predictive of phenotype: 
towards an understanding of the molecular basis of reduced penetrance in 
human inherited disease, 132 HUMAN GENETICS 1077, 1081 (2013) (“It is 
not hard to see why reduced penetrance might be much more common 
among described mutations than originally thought: whereas known 
pathological mutations have almost invariably been identified through 
retrospective analyses of families or well-defined groups of clinically 
symptomatic patients, relatively few prospective studies of asymptomatic 
carriers have so far been performed to derive estimates of penetrance.”). 
44. Based on feedback the initial report received, the ACMG solicited 
revisions to the original 2013 list and reviewed those proposals. ACMG 
then issued another statement in 2016 where they recommended reporting 
an additional set of mutations, (and removing one that had previously 
been recommended). The mutation that was removed from the 
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v2.0” and added another criterion for disclosure of SFs: acceptability of 
the proposed clinical intervention based on its risks and benefits.45 The 
working group stated that additional genes may be analyzed and 
reported if the lab deems it appropriate.46 
The ACMG working group justified their recommendations because 
laboratory personnel have a “fiduciary duty to prevent harm by 
warning patients and their families about certain incidental findings 
and that this principle supersedes concerns about autonomy.”47 
Fiduciary duties stem from agency principles, as the agent is often 
stepping in the shoes of the principal and should therefore assert the 
latter’s best interests in a loyal and honest way.48 While it makes sense 
to impose fiduciary obligations on health care providers, the lab does 
not sit in such a position to the patient. In any event, it is a confusing 
twist to use fiduciary principles to potentially thwart an individual’s 
right to autonomy, and provide information to them that they might 
not desire.49 Given that the ACMG report did expect that the lab 
results would be mediated through an ordering physician and not go 
directly to patients, it is peculiar that it did not place the fiduciary 
obligations there with the physician.50 
In March of 2014—motivated by strong condemnations that 
patients should be able to opt out of the analysis of SFs—the ACMG 
updated its recommendations to respect individuals’ “right not to 
know” their genotype.51 The new recommendations allow patients to  
recommended list was MYLK, which is associated with familial thoracic 
aortic aneurysm and dissection (FTAAD). It was removed after the 
ACMG SF 2.0 working group assessed the rarity of its pathogenic 
variants, the inability to effectively confirm it through diagnostic testing, 
and the lack of data on how effective medications are on reducing stress 
on the aorta. See, Kalia, supra note 40, at250-51. 
45. SF Lucy-Enid Ding, Leslie Burnett & Douglas Chesher, The Impact of 
Reporting Incidental Findings from Exome and Whole-Genome 
Sequencing: Predicted Frequencies Based on Modeling, 17 GENETICS IN 
MED. 197, 204 (2014)(finding that the riskier the intervention given the 
benefits, the less likely the SF mutation should be reported by the lab). 
Kalia, supra note 40, at 250 (studying the likelihood of SFs based on the 
ACMG criteria calculated that ~2.7% (range: 1.5–6.5%) of screened 
individuals would have a reportable). 
46. Green, supra note 32, at 569. 
47. Id. at 568. 
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §8.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2017). 
49. See Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, The Fiduciary Relationship Model for Managing 
Clinical Genomic “Incidental” Findings, 42 J. LAW MED. ETHICS 576, 3 
(2014). 
50. Green, supra note 32, at 568-70. 
51. Anastasia Richardson, Incidental Findings and Future Testing Methodologies: 
Potential Application of the ACMG 2013 Recommendations, 1 J. OF L. AND 
THE BIOSCIENCES 378, 381 (2014). 
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indicate that they would not like to receive SFs, through an advanced 
informed consent process.52 In the future, it is possible that informed 
consent procedures will take care of several of the issues presented in 
this article, as patients can let their physician and laboratory know 
what types of SFs they would like to have disclosed.53 But as most 
informed consent documents struggle to anticipate every contingency, 
adequately define terms, respond to evolving clinical information, and 
present information in a way that is easily understood by patients, this 
dilemma over the return of SFs will not be solved by informed consent 
procedures. This informed consent remedy also assumes that the insti-
tution requires some form of express consent before submitting tissue 
for genetic analysis, which not all clinics do.54 Further, the duty to warn 
is not coterminous with what a patient has expressly agreed to be told 
in advance. The very idea that courts can impose duties through tort 
law suggests that these legal obligations override what parties agree to 
in advance through negotiation or contract. Tort duties exist in addi-
tion to, or instead of, contractual obligations. 
In the future, interoperable medical records might help avoid this 
dilemma because the lab could return the SFs to the physician and 
import the data into a searchable electronic medical record. Then, at a 
later encounter when the physician meets with the patient, the 
physician could ask the patient whether she would like to know about 
this particular SF. If warranted, the physician could also request a 
consult with a genetics counselor to help the patient understand the SF 
and put it in context. This technological tool would greatly assist the 
transmission of SFs to patients in a responsible way. But it too falls 
short of solving the present problem of whether labs might have some 
affirmative duty to reach out to a non-consenting patient and offer 
information regarding SFs before it becomes clinically relevant. 
While the ACMG report provides some professional guidance to 
clinical laboratories, it does not answer the question of whether they 
might face tort liability for failing to return SFs. Ethical obligations do 
not automatically create legal obligations. Applying common law prin-
ciples from negligence and the duty to warn, this article concludes that 
while there might be ethical obligations to return particular SFs to 
patients, there should not presently be any legal obligation to do so. 
 
52. ACMG Board of Directors, ACMG Policy Statement: Updated Recom-
mendations Regarding Analysis and Reporting of Secondary Findings in 
Clinical Genome-Scale Sequencing, 17 GENETICS IN MED. 68, 68 (2014). 
53. Id. 
54. See A Helpful Introduction to Torts, LAWS.COM, https://tort.laws.com/to
rts (last visited March 13, 2018). 
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IV. Applying The Inelegant but Flexible Law of 
Negligence 
Torts like negligence provide a flexible means for compensating 
injured parties. But the system offers an inefficient means to ensure 
patient safety and autonomy. By the time a plaintiff files suit, the 
plaintiff has already suffered an injury. There are also major disin-
centives to filing a lawsuit, such as lost time and the emotional distress 
from litigation.55 Even in the unusual case where a plaintiff is paid a 
settlement or receives damages, a third of anything he or she receives 
typically goes to the attorneys. Despite these shortcoming, without 
political will and targeted regulation, tort law can provide some com-
pensation and possible deterrence for careless actions.56 
In Williams v. Quest Diagnostics case, a mother sued the lab after 
it conducted her son’s genetic testing for Dravet’s disease under the 
theory that its failure to label her son’s SCN1A mutation as disease-
causing led to his death.57 In such a case, tort law provides the only 
means of compensation.58 There is no other criminal, statutory, contract 
or regulatory remedy.59 It’s a tort law remedy or nothing. 
In any negligence action, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant breached a duty it owed to plaintiff, causing an injury the 
law finds worthy of compensation. Essentially, a plaintiff must prove 
four elements: (1) duty; (2) breach, (3) causation; and (4) injury.60 If 
the plaintiff cannot prove these by the preponderance of the evidence, 
she loses. And this is before a defendant raises any affirmative defen-
ses.61  
55. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, How Should Courts Handle Frequent Fliers? 
A Trampling Incident at a Florida Wal-Mart Highlights a Dilemma, 
FINDLAW (Dec. 10, 2003), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentar
y/how-should-courts-handle-frequent-filers.html. 
56. See generally A Helpful Introduction to Torts, LAWS.COM, 
https://tort.laws.com/torts (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
57. Jennifer Wagner, Litigating the Accountability of Clinical Genomics 
Laboratories, Genomics Law Report, GENOMICS L. REP., https://www.gen
omicslawreport.com/index.php/2016/05/31/litigating-the-accountability-
of-genomics-laboratories/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018)(“More than 1250 
epilepsy-causing mutations have been reported in this gene, and about 
95% of patients with Dravet syndrome have de novo heterozygous 
mutations (meaning the parents do not carry the mutations”). 
58. Id.  
59. See Tort, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/tort (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
60. See David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1671, 1672 (2007). 
61. See Carl Barbier and Donna Phillips Currault, Fundamentals of Rule 12, 
FBA NO CHAPTER (Mar. 26, 2015), http://nofba.org/wp-content/up
loads/Fundamentals-of-Rule-12.pdf. 
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In the U.S., the common law of tort has traditionally emphasized 
whether the defendant’s action—rather than his inaction—injured the 
plaintiff.62 The law expects people to conduct themselves in reasonable 
and careful ways, but the law typically did not hold defendants liable 
for negligence due to inaction unless their previous action caused the 
risk of harm.63 Generally, a defendant has no “duty to rescue.”64 Even 
where the defendant “realizes or should realize that action on his part 
is necessary for another’s aid or protection,” the Second Restatement 
of Torts recognizes that this “does not of itself impose upon him a duty 
to take such action.”65 Thus, a lab’s belief that disclosure could prevent 
harm to a patient does not create a tort duty to disclose. The U.S. is 
unusual in this regard, as most European countries impose some duty 
to rescue by statute. Only three states in the U.S. have imposed, by 
statute, an affirmative duty for private citizens to rescue strangers.66 
Over the course of the last forty years, this sharp distinction 
between action and inaction—also known as misfeasance and nonfea-
sance in torts parlance—has eroded. Where certain policy factors are 
present, and the plaintiff stands in some “special relationship” with the 
defendant, most state courts recognize that a defendant may now be 
considered negligent for failing to act.67 Despite the general expansion 
of the notion of duty in recent years, this expansion is not without 
limits. The typical cases where courts impose an affirmative duty to 
warn can be easily distinguished from the return of SFs in asym- 
62. See Jennifer L. Groninger, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really 
Leave a Victim Lying in the Street? What is Left of the American Rule, 
and Will it Survive Unabated?, 26 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 353, 376 (1999). 
63. STEVEN R. SMITH & ROBERT G. MEYER, LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND MENTAL 
HEALTH: POLICY AND PRACTICE 41 (1987). 
64. Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of A Duty to 
Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1459 
(2008) (“In the midst of this more or less pervasive obligation of 
reasonable precaution and care generated by the operation of negligence 
law, there exists a black hole, a small void in which the duty of reasonable 
care does not apply.”). 
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (Am. L. Inst.1965). 
66. Vermont, Rhode Island, and Minnesota have enacted statutory duties to 
rescue. According to David Hyman, “Vermont and Rhode Island require 
individuals to perform non-risky rescues; Minnesota requires individuals 
to either perform the non-risky rescue or provide notice of the problem to 
police or rescue personnel. One other state, Wisconsin, has a statute that 
requires persons present at the scene of a crime to either report the 
incident to the police or to assist the crime victim. Several other states 
have imposed limited duties to report crimes, and every state imposes a 
duty to remain at the scene of a car accident at least long enough to 
render aid and exchange information, when it is safe to do so.” David A. 
Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to 
Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 683–84 (2006). 
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (Am. L. Inst.1965). 
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ptomatic individuals. The remainder of this article will address the 
contexts in which courts have been willing to impose an affirmative 
duty to warn. 
a. The History and Expansion of A Duty To Warn in Negligence 
The threshold legal question in a negligence action is whether the 
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.68 And duties are about 
relationships. It is typically not enough for the plaintiff to show that 
the defendant owed a duty “to the world at large or to some other 
person, but instead plaintiff must show that he was within a class of 
persons to whom the defendant owed a duty to refrain from the 
allegedly negligent or wrongful conduct.”69 As torts scholar Dean 
Prosser put it, “duty . . . is a question of whether the defendant is under 
any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff.”70 In most cases, 
it is presumed that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to take care 
not to cause the type of injury that she suffered. We each owe a duty 
to drive our cars carefully so as not to injure others on the road. 
Contractors owe a duty to build safe houses for anyone who might use 
the house. Pharmacists have a duty to the patients whose medicines 
they dispense.71 It is often assumed that the defendant owes the plaintiff 
a duty, so the parties do not litigate this element.72 But in cases based 
on novel relationships, the question of whether the defendant owed the 
particular plaintiff a duty is complex. Nowhere is this trickier than 
when the law expects the defendant not to be careful when acting, but 
to be careful by acting. Courts are reluctant to impose an affirmative 
duty to act if the default or baseline is no action. 
Whether to impose a duty is “an expression of the sum total of 
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection’ against the defendant’s 
conduct.”73 Unlike the other fact-dependent elements of the negligence 
cause of action—determinable by juries—judges determine whether the 
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.74 This is because the 
imposition of a duty involves questions of public policy. As judges are 
 
68. D.E. Buckner, Comment Note- Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence 
and Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942, §2[a] (1965). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. John Goldberg, Anthony Sebok, and Benjamin Zipursky, TORT LAW: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 52 (4th ed 2106). 
72. Id. at 51. 
73. Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation 88 Cal. App. 3d 342,348 (quoting 
William L. Prosser, TORTS 325-26 (4th ed. 1971)); Dugard v. United 
States, 835 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2016). 
74. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1014, 1022 (1928). 
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better positioned to evaluate the social costs and benefits of imposing 
a duty, this responsibility falls to them.75 Of course, this gives judges 
power in negligence cases. Judges can take a case away from the jury 
and resolve it themselves if they decide that this class of defendants 
owes no duty to this class of plaintiffs, even if the defendant caused the 
plaintiff’s injury through his unreasonable behavior.76 This power might 
be shocking to those who are not familiar with tort law. The recent 
Third Restatement of Torts reflected a concern that judges may take 
too many cases away from juries on grounds of duty and cautioned 
against this. 77 Even so, courts still routinely exercise this control over 
their dockets. 
b. Crucially, There is no “Special Relationship” Between the Lab and 
Patient 
Whether a duty exists is intimately related to the question of the 
content of the duty. It is possible for a person to owe no duty of care 
in one context, a minimal duty in another, and an expansive duty in a 
third context.78 Much hinges on whether a special relationship exists 
between the parties. If there is no special relationship, courts are 
reluctant to impose broad, affirmative duties to rescue or warn. 
Examples of typical “special relationships” are those of landlord/ 
tenant, business/customer, airplane/passenger, school/student, hotel/ 
guest or physician/patient.79 Tort law finds these relationships special 
because the subordinated plaintiff places his or her wellbeing or safety 
in the trust and control of the defendant.80 Because of the control that 
the landlord, business owner, and airline operator have over access to 
their apartments, businesses, and airplanes, customers cannot always  
75. See Lisa M. Nuttall, Tort Law – Foreseeability vs. Public Policy 
Considerations in Determining the Duty of Physicians to Non-Patients – 
Lester v. Hall, 30 N.M. L. REV. 351, 353, 359 (2000). 
76. See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (1966). 
77. See George W. Soule and Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Warn in 
Minnesota, The New Restatement on Products Liability, and The 
Application of the Reasonable Care Standard, 21 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. 
REV. 389, 389, 392 (1995). 
78. See Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802, 832–34 (Conn. 2012) (citing Doe v. 
Yale University, 659, 748 A.2d 834, 855 (Conn. 2000)) (type of duty 
claimed can determine whether negligence claim is cognizable); Clohessy 
v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 860 (Conn. 1996) (“[t]he nature of the 
[defendant’s] duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are 
determined by the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the 
individual” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). 
79. See Claire Elaine Radcliffe, A Duty to Rescue: The Good, the Bad, and 
the Indifferent – The Bystander’s Dilemma, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 387, 
395-96 (1986). 
80. See id. at 395. 
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receive help from others. With this control and power comes some 
fiduciary obligations to protect the vulnerable customer. 81 A more 
vulnerable and less-sophisticated plaintiff expects the more-powerful 
defendant to use heightened care.82 Courts routinely apply this dynamic 
to the physician/patient relationship.83 
It is precisely because of the special relationship between physician 
and patient that courts have imposed expansive affirmative obligations 
on physicians to warn, protect, and inform patients—and even non-
patients—of foreseeable risks of harm.84 But before we can explore 
whether to extend the “duty to warn” cases from physicians to 
laboratories I will flush out the extent to which the relationship between 
the patient and the lab is very different from the relationship between 
the patient and her physician.85 
The relationship between a patient and his or her clinical laboratory 
is much more attenuated than the relationship between patient and 
physician. Most patients never meet laboratory technicians. Hospitals 
contract with different labs, such that if a patient submits two samples, 
they may each go to a different entity, with a different person analyzing 
their samples every time.86 Typically the ordering physician mediates 
the patient’s sole interaction with the clinical lab. Patients do not have 
the same intimate conversations—based on trust and expertise—that 
they have with their physician. Patients do not expect loyalty from 
their lab and there is certainly a much less developed canon of labor- 
81. See Barbara Black, Transforming Rhetoric into Reality: A Federal 
Remedy for Negligent Brokerage Advice, 8 TRANSACTIONS 101, 114 (2006). 
82. See Radcliffe, supra note 79, at 396. 
83. See Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What We Should from Doctors: Rethinking 
Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 13 HEALTH 
MATRIX 235, 236-37 (2003). 
84. See Safer v. Pack, 291 N.J. Super. 619 (1996), Gill v. Hartford Accident 
& Indem. Co., 337 So.2d 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Cheeks v. Dorsey, 
846 So.2d 1169, 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Emerich v. Phila. Ctr. 
for Human Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1037-1038 (Pa. 1998). 
85. An important question for deeper analysis elsewhere is whether a 
physician who is also a researcher can disavow the strong 
patient/physician relationship when he is wearing his researcher hat. The 
fiduciary obligation does not disappear when the physician is conducting 
research. The physician does not stop being the patient’s physician, even 
if the nature of the relationship is very different, and the researcher is no 
longer prioritizing the patient’s individual treatment. Even so, from the 
perspective of the patient’s expectations and trust, it is likely the “special 
relationship” continues to exist and can support broad, affirmative duties 
to warn patient/subjects. See Donna T. Chen, et al., Clinical Research 
and the Physician-Patient Relationship, 138 138 ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MED. 669, 669 (2003). 
86. Jim Gozvoda and Jeff Raasch, Hospitals Putting Their Labs in One Place, 
HOSPITALS & HEALTH NETWORKS, (Aug. 11, 2007), https://www
.hhnmag.com/articles/8517-core-hospital-labs 
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atory ethics governing the communications between lab and patient.87 
The physician-patient relationship might be fetishized because many of 
us no longer have such intimate relationships with our primary-care 
doctors, let alone with specialists. But the tradition of trust, physical 
custody, communicative intimacy, ethics, and the unequal power dy-
namic generates the kind of “special relationship” courts recognize bet-
ween physicians and patients.88 These elements are not present between 
a patient and the clinical laboratory. 
Some may argue that a special relationship exists between the 
patient and laboratory because the patient puts her tissue or blood 
sample into the laboratory’s control and custody. But the law does not 
demand physical control or for a special relationship to attach. And 
where it is present, it is typically the custody of the whole person that 
creates the kind of special relationship that imposes a heightened tort 
duty.89 The bases for these protective obligations arise out of concerns 
for personal safety.90 An individual’s safety is not threatened by sub-
mitting a tissue sample to a clinical laboratory. 
Courts have gone to great lengths to preserve the sanctity and 
clarity of physician-patient communication. For instance, courts have 
refrained from imposing duties on pharmacists, ultrasonographers, and 
other clinical technicians out of concern that imposing a duty on these 
individuals might conflict with the physician-patient relationship or 
confuse the message delivered to the patient.91 Courts have been 
reluctant to require pharmacists to identify contraindications of drugs 
that the physician specifically ordered, because the physician knows the 
patient’s history better and is thought to be in as good of a position as 
the pharmacist to identify which drugs are best for their patients.92 
While pharmacists have greater interactions with patients than labs do, 
courts still prefer the physician to serve as the primary clinical liaison. 
Funneling reporting responsibilities through the physician ensures that 
the patient does not receive conflicting communication, but it places a 
great deal of responsibility on general practitioners. Some of this rea- 
87. See, How It Works, LABCORP, https://www.labcorp.com/help/using-
labcorp (last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
88. Andrea Schwab, The Physician-Patient Relationship, 108 TEX. MED. 
ASS’N. 48, 48 (2012). 
89. See id. 
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 40 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012). 
91. See Lauren Fleischer, From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists’ 
Standard of Care in Negligence Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, at 168 
(1999). 
92. Pharmacists’ Duty to Warn, NAT’L ASS’N OF CHAIN DRUG STORES, 
https://www.nacds.org/pdfs/membership/duty_to_warn.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2017); JA Ansari, Drug Interaction and Pharmacist¸ 2 J. 
OF YOUNG PHARMACISTS 326, 329 (2010). 
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soning might stem from the “learned intermediary” doctrine in products 
liability.93 Under this doctrine, the manufacturer of a drug or device 
need not directly warn a patient, so long as it warned the “learned 
intermediary,” a prescribing physician.94 The physician has a duty to 
warn the patient and the manufacturer is not liable even where the 
physician does not actually pass along the warning.95 
While a laboratory may have better information as to which 
mutations are actionable, highly penetrant, or lead to severe loss of 
function, it must share this information with the physician, who can 
translate it and place it into context for the patient. 96 Pilot data suggest 
that patients can take SFs in stride and that patients and primary-care 
physicians can digest such implications without unnecessarily using 
health care resources or becoming distressed.97 Even if physicians need 
to consult genetics counselors, physicians are still better positioned to 
communicate nuance to the patients. Imposing this obligation on lab-
oratories could interfere with physician-patient communication. 
Because no “special relationship” exists between a clinical labora-
tory and a patient, a more nuanced analysis that considers larger policy 
considerations, is necessary. This article will address those policy con-
siderations, as they have developed through the case law. This requires 
 
93. See, Fleischer, supra note 91, at 168 n. 21-22 (citing Reyes v. Wyeth 
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1976)); Presto v. Sandoz 
Pharms. Co., 487 S.E.2d 70, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Kirk v. Michael 
Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d. 387, 395 (Ill. 1987)). 
94. See, Diane Schmauder Kane, Construction and Application of Learned-
Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5TH 1 (1998) (“Under the circumstances 
presented in the cases described below, the courts concluded that a 
learned intermediary’s negligence in prescribing, administering, or 
treating an injured patient was a primary, superseding cause of the 
patient’s injuries, thereby severing the causal connection between the 
manufacturer’s alleged inadequate warnings and the patient’s ultimate 
injury.”). 
95. Carol Rooney, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: An Update, 30 TRIAL 
ADVOC. Q., 6 (2010) (“The learned intermediary doctrine allows the man-
ufacturers of prescription drugs or medical devices to defend against a 
claim of failure to warn brought by an injured patient by showing that 
they provided adequate warnings to the prescribing physician.”). 
96. See 42 C.F.R. §493.1291(l) (2017), and Keyan Salari, The Dawning Era 
of Personalized Medicine Exposes a Gap in Medical Education, 6 PLOS 
1,2 (2009). 
97. Vassy, supra note 13, at 160. However, this study was based upon a 
convenience sample of 9 physicians from one network in the highly-
academic Boston environs. So even though the data are interesting, their 
reassuring findings might not extrapolate to the general primary care 
population, where physicians may not have the resources or knowledge to 
help patients interpret the data. But we do learn from this study that the 
disclosure can be a fruitful one, and does not always require the 
interpretation of a genetics counselor. 
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traditional legal reasoning through analogy, comparing our situation to 
the cases where novel duties to warn have been imposed. 
V. The Development of the Rowland Factors 
In the late 1960s, beginning in California, state judges began 
expanding the scope of liability by imposing new affirmative duties. 
Rowland v. Christian began this shift.98 In Rowland, the plaintiff, while 
visiting his friend, severed tendons in his hand while using her broken 
bathroom faucet.99 He sued his friend under a common-law negligence 
theory—probably because she had renter’s insurance and would not be 
paying the damages herself—arguing that she knew about the broken 
faucet and therefore had a duty to warn him about it.100 Before 
Rowland, owners of land did not owe a duty to warn social guests of 
such risks, but they did have a duty to warn people invited to their 
homes for business purposes.101 Reflecting the egalitarian principles of 
the era, the court emphasized that “a man’s life or limb does not become 
less worthy of protection by the law” because he was a social guest and 
not a business invitee.102 
Rowland revolutionized the duty analysis. In recognizing a new 
duty to warn social guests of concealed risks in their homes, Rowland 
established the general principle “that a person is liable for injuries 
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances,”103 
and no exception to this rule automatically applied when the injury 
resulted from defendant’s inaction.104 Rowland could carry forward with 
his negligence claim. The fact that Christian had failed to act—rather 
than acted carelessly—was not dispositive. Of course, the plaintiff still 
had to prove that the defendant’s behavior fell below an acceptable 
standard of care, causing the plaintiff’s injury.105 But Rowland could go 
to trial for a jury to decide these issues. 
The case opened the duty to warn to a more flexible analysis and 
blurred the sharp distinction between action and inaction. Judges 
became empowered to impose affirmative duties to warn in a broad 
swathe of cases. Indeed, Rowland provided the framework and justi- 
98. See Robert S. Driscoll, The Law of Premises Liability in America: Its 
Past, Present, and Some Considerations for Its Future, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 881, 881 (2006). 
99. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 562 (Cal. 1968)(later codified at CA 
Civ Code §847 (2016)). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 556. 
102. Id. at 568. 
103. Id. at 564. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 568. 
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fication for Tarasoff, where California notoriously imposed on psycho-
therapists a duty to warn identifiable non-patients of serious risk of 
harm.106 While Tarasoff did not require an imminent threat—indeed 
the defendant did not murder Tarasoff until ten weeks after discussing 
his threats with his psychotherapist—eighteen states and the District 
of Columbia now require that to establish a duty to protect third-
parties a threat must be either “imminent” or “immediate.”107 
What began with understated language from Rowland blossomed 
into an entirely new paradigm, where the law may impose liability for 
failing to act on many classes of tortfeasors. The default rule in Cali-
fornia, and now elsewhere, is that the defendant owes all reasonably 
foreseeable plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care.108 The Rowland court 
provided “a number of considerations” that courts should weigh when 
deciding whether to depart from the general presumption of a duty.109 
These factors have been cited by several hundreds of courts in many 
states.110 The considerations are: 
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (3) the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury 
suffered, the (4) moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, 
the (5) policy of preventing future harm, the (6) extent of the 
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, 
and (7) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the 
risk involved.111 
 
106. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 340-343 (Cal. 
1976) (“We shall explain that defendant therapists cannot escape liability 
merely because Tatiana herself was not their patient. When a therapist 
determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, 
that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs 
an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against 
such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take 
one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case.”). 
107. Mark A. Rothstein, Tarasoff Duties After Newtown, 42 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 104, 107 (2014). 
108. See Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 71 (Cal. 1998). 
109. Rowland, 433 P.2d at 564. 
110. The current citation references in Westlaw lists the relevant headnote keycite 
being cited a whopping 616 times by other courts. Rowland v. Christian, 
Cases, WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (last visited Feb. 26, 2018). 
111. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564. 
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VI. Applying the Rowland Factors to the Problem at 
Hand 
While the Rowland court did not tell future judges how to weigh 
these various factors, it has become clear that—as with traditional duty 
analysis—foreseeability and the magnitude of the harm receive the most 
weight. But the actual weight accorded to each factor depends on the 
case’s circumstances.112 Because of their instrumental role in developing 
the duty to warn, including in the context of duties owed to third 
parties, this article applies the Rowland factors to the potential for the 
laboratory’s liability for failure to warn of SFs. 
a. The First Factor: The Foreseeability of Harm 
In the positive law of all but three states, the primary touchstone 
of any duty analysis is whether the harm to the plaintiff is foreseeable.113 
When a judge asks whether the harm is foreseeable, she does not ask 
whether in fact this defendant predicted the likely occurrence of an 
event. Rather, she asks whether the defendant should have realized that 
her conduct put someone else at likely risk of harm.114 In most cases 
this means that the harm must be likely, but not necessarily certain or 
even “more likely than not.”115 Thus, defendants must foresee only 
reasonably likely harms, rather than every possibility of harm.116 In the  
112. O’Hara v. Holy Cross Hosp., 561 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ill. 1990). 
113. See Formet v. Lloyd Termite Control Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 557 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“The foreseeability of the harm, though not 
determinative, has become the chief factor in duty analysis.”): see also 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate 
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1257-1258 (2009)(The Reporters 
of the recent Restatement of Torts reject the reliance on foreseeability in 
the analysis of duty, but in so doing, they “risk damaging the credibility 
of the Restatement (Third) as a ‘restatement’ by declining to put 
foreseeability in the black letter” . . . as “foreseeability is overwhelmingly 
embraced by American courts as a vitally important part of duty 
analysis.” To varying degrees, Washington, New York, and Arizona courts 
have expressed some disfavor with relying too much on foreseeability in 
analysis of duty.). 
114. ROBERT H. DIERKER AND RICHARD J. MEHAN, 34 MO. PRAC., PERSONAL 
INJURY AND TORTS HANDBOOK, §2:6 (2016 ed.) (“Foreseeability is 
established when “the evidence indicates that the defendant had actual or 
constructive knowledge that there was some probability of a sufficiently 
serious injury that an ordinary person would take precautions to avoid 
it.”). 
115. See Chapman v. Mayfield, 361 P.3d 566, 572 (Or. 2015)(“It is not 
necessary that the risk of harm be more probable than not; rather, the 
question is whether a reasonable person considering the potential harms 
that might result from his or her conduct would “have reasonably 
expected the injury to occur.”). 
116. BARRY A. LINDAHI, Existence of duty in MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND 
LITIGATION § 3:17 (2d ed. 2017). 
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context of a laboratory’s affirmative duty to warn, a judge would need 
to find that the defendant should reasonably have recognized that her 
failure to disclose SFs would likely cause someone harm.117 
The most obvious harm would be that the patient’s delayed diag-
nosis caused her to incur greater medical expenses or suffer a worse 
prognosis. This could arise from a physician’s failing to treat something 
that could have been treated or prescribing the wrong medicine given 
the likelihood of a serious drug reaction. Of course, when it comes to 
causation the plaintiff must prove that the physician would have done 
something differently because of the SF. But this is also a component 
of the foreseeability analysis. Unless the performance of the duty would 
have prevented the injury, it makes no sense to impose it. 
The laboratory must have actual or constructive knowledge that 
there is a reasonably possible causal link between the genotype and 
developing a clinically-actionable disease. It is this probable link that 
makes the risk of harm foreseeable. Without knowledge that the genetic 
mutation is likely pathogenic, there is nothing clinically actionable. 
Thus, no potential harm flows from a failure to disclose it. One version 
of harm contemplates not that the patient would be put on notice to 
pursue contemporaneous treatments, but that she might need to be 
extra vigilant for warning signs that she was developing the disease, so 
that she could catch it and treat it early. But even in the “need for 
medical monitoring” case, the harm is a missed opportunity for a poten-
tially successful clinical intervention. If a physician cannot do anything 
to mitigate the genetic risk, there is no duty for the physician to “warn” 
of the latent genetic risk. 
We cannot say, in the abstract, whether the risk of harm from non-
disclosure of SFs is foreseeable.118 Foreseeability hinges on such things 
as the type of information the laboratory conveyed, to whom it con-
veyed the information, and the seriousness and specificity of the 
warning. Specifically, the notion of genetic penetrance plays a huge role 
in these types of cases because it makes the foreseeability analysis more 
complex and less clear-cut than it is in other duty to warn cases. 
 
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY & PHYSICAL HARM § 41 cmt. 
c (Am. Law. Inst. 2010) (“When no reasonable jury could find that there 
was a foreseeable risk of harm or a failure to exercise reasonable care, 
courts find no liability as a matter of law.”). No one is expected to “warn” 
people of things that pose no risk; indeed, this is the very nature of a 
warning in that it communicates some impending danger or threat. 
118. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, FOR 
RESEARCHERS: INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS (2016), available at: 
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/Resear
cher%20Primer%20Incidental%20Findings%2010.30.16.pdf. 
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i. What is Penetrance and How Does it Impact the Foreseeability 
Analysis? 
Penetrance—an important factor in the foreseeability analysis—
played a role in the ACMG report. If penetrance is low, then many 
people with a genetic mutation will never develop the phenotype, even 
if they have one of the associated markers.119 For example, many people 
with mutations in the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes—those associated with 
lung and ovarian cancer—will develop cancer during their lifetime, but 
almost as many people will not.120 Currently, geneticists cannot predict 
which people with these mutations will develop cancer or when the 
tumors will develop, though a family history certainly increases risk.121 
Due to the influence of hard-to-measure environmental factors and the 
low base rates of some diseases in the population, geneticists will 
probably never forecast, with high predictive values, who will develop 
many complex cancers such as breast or ovarian cancer.122 
A study of symptomatic individuals found the following mean 
cumulative cancer risks for mutation carriers at age seventy: “a breast 
cancer risk of 55 percent for BRCA1 and 47 percent for BRCA2 
mutation carriers; and an ovarian cancer risk of 39 percent for BRCA1 
and 17 percent for BRCA2 mutation carriers.”123 While a breast cancer 
risk of 57 percent certainly seems sufficient to constitute “foreseeable,” 
this is not an accurate predictor in the context of SFs because studies 
have not tracked many people with the genotype who do not also have 
the phenotype. Current estimates represent the average risk for people 
who already have symptoms of cancer, and usually a family history of 
cancer.124 For the individuals tested for some other reason—and not 
specifically tested for BRCA1 or BRCA2—their risk of developing the 
disease will be lower.125 These patients are not likely to be symptomatic 
and probably do not have a family history of breast or ovarian cancer 
that served as the basis for having the genetic test.126 
 
119. See Green et al., supra note 24, at 568. 
120. BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER 
INST. (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-preve
ntion/genetics/brca-fact-sheet. 
121. Id. 
122. C. Marzuillo et al., Predictive Genetic Testing for Complex Diseases: A 
Public Health Perspective, 107 Q. J. MED. 93, 94 (2014). 
123. Sining Chen & Giovanni Parmigianni, Meta-Analysis of BRCA1 and BRCA2 
Penetrance, 11 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1329, 1333 (2007). 
124. Id. at 1330. 
125. See BRCAI and BRCA2, supra note 120. 
126. D Gareth Evans et al., Long-term prospective clinical follow-up after 
BRCA1/2 presymptomatic testing: BRCA2 risks higher than in adjusted 
retrospective studies 51 J. MED. GENETICS 573, 573 (2014) (“Breast cancer 
risks in large familial breast cancer kindreds with BRCA1/BRCA2 
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Further, the penetrance and risk factors for everyone are always 
changing, as global environmental changes such as pollution and 
chemical exposure can lead to “birth cohort effects”, where older women 
—a group of people born before 1940—have lower penetrance risk than 
women born after 1940, or in a later “birth cohort”.127 The birth-cohort 
effect demonstrates that for some diseases, penetrance risks change at 
the population level, which probably relates to increased or decreased 
environmental risks, although these changes are undetectable for gener-
ations.128 As penetrance decreases, the foreseeability of harm from a pos-
itive SF decreases. 
Similar to disease-prediction, the penetrance and expression of 
pharmacogenomics can be complex, making the foreseeability of harm 
to any individual difficult to assess.129 Pharmacogenomics studies how 
genetic mutations can predict drug metabolism and adverse drug 
reactions.130 While genetic factors contribute to adverse drug reactions, 
the extent of the genetic contribution varies depending on the person 
and the disease process.131 This makes it “difficult to estimate in quanti-
tative terms the contribution of genetic factors relative to other non-
genetic factors in predisposing to specific [adverse drug reactions].”132 
While it is becoming easier to predict adverse drug reactions caused by 
a small number of genetic mutations, predicting complex traits, 
involving multiple mutations with small effects, is “almost impossible 
in the foreseeable future.”133 Only if the penetrance and expression will 
lead to significant harm should the lab have any duty to warn the 
 
mutations are substantially higher than risks derived from population-
based [asymptomatic or presymptomatic] studies.”). 
127. Mary Claire King et al, Breast and Ovarian Cancer Risks Due to Inherited 
Mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2, 302 SCIENCE 643, Figure 1 (2003) 
(“Age by age, breast cancer risks for mutation carriers born after 1940 
were significantly higher than risks for mutation carriers in the same 
families born before 1940.”). 
128. Id. 
129. Alfirevic, supra note 4, at 100 (“However, it has been estimated that 
approximately 20–30% of ADRs could be prevented by pharmacogenetic 
testing.”). 
130. Urs A. Meyer, Pharmacogenetics and Adverse Drug Reactions, 356 
LANCET 1667, 1667 (2000). 
131. Id. 
132. Alfirevic, supra note 4, at 100. Ana Alfirevic and Munir Pirmohamed, 
Genomics of Adverse Drug Reactions, 38 TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL 
SCIENCES 100 (2017) 
133. Ge Zhang and Daniel Nebert, Personalized medicine: Genetic risk 
prediction of drug response, 175 PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 75 
(2017) [hereinafter Zhang]. 
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patient, through her provider, of this SF.134 But if the likelihood of ever 
needing a particular drug is incredibly low, there may be no duty to warn. 
The best example of this is the use of human leukocyte antigen 
(HLA-B) testing to prevent abacavir hypersensitivity, a severe adverse 
reaction to an HIV drug, which can cause death.135 The utility of HLA-
B testing has been demonstrated in controlled trials and its predictive 
value and cost-effectiveness has been assessed in different ethnic groups 
and healthcare settings.136 And yet, it might still not overcome the 
hurdles of foreseeability and imminence because, it is quite unlikely that 
an individual would develop HIV and require abacavir.137 In this type 
of scenario, it is more appropriate to put this duty-to-warn on the 
infectious-disease doctor who prescribed abacavir. Presumably, the 
doctor is better positioned to know the adverse-drug reactions for the 
drugs they routinely prescribe. The doctor should test all patients the 
HLA-B marker before administering abacavir.138 As the list of SFs con-
tinues to grow, patients cannot be expected to retain this information 
for future, potential, clinical use.139 
As with other genetic SFs, there will be many false positives due to 
the rarity of these adverse-drug events and incomplete penetrance and 
environmental risk factors.140 But the risk of false positives for adverse 
drug reactions is less catastrophic than with disease-causing SFs, 
because the issue is not about a patient receiving stressful news that 
she might develop cancer or Alzheimer’s disease. Instead, the issue is 
about warning her that should she ever need a particular drug, if there 
is an available and reasonable substitute, she should take it instead. 
This presents a very different cost-benefit analysis and makes it less 
likely someone would choose not to receive a warning. 
 
134. Id. 
135. Alfirevic, supra note 4, at 102. 
136. Id. 
137. HIV in the United States: At A Glance, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/h
iv/statistics/overview/ataglance.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2017). 
138. LAURA DEAN, Abacavir Therapy and HLA-B*57:01 Genotype, in MEDICAL 
GENETICS SUMMARIES 7 (2015). 
139. The increasing use of electronic, interoperable medical records provides 
an exciting technological fix to this problem, where SFs can be stored in 
a medical record and physicians can be notified of them when and if the 
SF becomes clinically relevant. See Nicole Weiskopf & Chunhua Weng, 
Methods and Dimensions of Electronic Health Record Data Quality 
Assessment: Enabling Reuse for Clinical Research, 20 JAMA 144, 144 
(2013). 
140. Zhang, supra note 133. 
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ii. What is Expression and How Does it Impact the Foreseeability 
Analysis? 
Another important factor in the foreseeability analysis is variable 
expressivity, which captures the idea that a disorder’s severity can 
change from one person to the next, even though they possess the same 
disease-causing genetic mutation.141 For example, some people with 
Marfan’s disease are taller than average with long fingers, while others 
may also experience life-threatening heart and circulatory symptoms.142 
Variable expressivity affects the analysis of duty because a disease that 
presents in varying intensity (could be negligible, could be debilitating) 
reduces the certainty of significant harm. This, in turn, makes the 
average risk less foreseeable and reduces the pressure to impose a duty 
to warn. The genetics of many disorders are complex and there is still 
quite a bit unknown about whether a mutation will lead to severe 
disease.143 Environmental factors can increase or decrease penetrance 
and expression, as can the presence of other genetic mutations that 
amplify or soften the effect of a deleterious mutation.144 Defendants 
generally do not have duties to warn of minimal or trivial risks.145 If 
judges take seriously the complexity of genetic causes of disease, judges 
should be reluctant to extend a duty for labs to warn of SFs with the 
potential for minimal and benign expression. 
iii. What is Analytic Validity and How will it Impact the Foreseeability 
Analysis? 
In addition to expecting false positives due to incomplete 
penetrance, there will also be many false negatives, particularly when 
the laboratory analyzes the sample using WES. Researchers have 
warned that clinical-exome sequencing to interpret and report parti-
cular genes “requires recognition of the substantial possibility of inad-
equate depth and breadth of sequencing coverage at clinically relevant 
locations,” which will contribute to false-negatives. 146 This is a problem 
because the ACMG report recommended that every clinical-exome test 
 
141. Cooper et al., supra note 43, at 1078. 
142. Id. at 1077. 
143. Id. at 1079. See also What Do We Mean by ‘Duty to Warn?’, AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/news-
room/apa-blogs/apa-blog/2018/01/what-do-we-mean-by-duty-to-warn 
[hereinafter Duty to Warn]. 
144. Id. at 1079.  
145. What Do We Mean by ‘Duty to Warn’, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Jan. 16, 
2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/news-room/apa-blogs/apa-blog/201
8/01/what-do-we-mean-by-duty-to-warn [hereinafter Am. Psychiatric 
Ass’n]. 
146. Jason Park et al., Clinical Exome Performance for Reporting Secondary 
Genetic Findings, 61 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 213, 220 (2015). 
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report on fifty-nine genes, even though the analytical validity of exome 
sequencing for these mutations may be of insufficient quality.147 Poor 
quality occurs because the test would not validate the exome screen for 
locating SF mutations. This means that the developers of the exome 
sequencing screens recognize that there is a lot of noise and clutter in 
the haystack that is searched.148 Significant things can be missed and 
insignificant things can be found. In order to confirm to confirm or 
diagnose the presence of a mutation, one would not use exome sequen-
cing to do it.149 After an initial positive finding on exome sequencing, 
the physician would follow up with a targeted test that is validated at 
finding a particular needle in the vast haystack.150 There are a few 
technical reasons why the exome sequencing is not good at diagnostics. 
First, the exome sequencing does not cover everything. Estimates of the 
coding sequence not covered by exome sequencing range from 1.4 to 
39.1 percent.151 Coverage will vary based on the quality parameters of 
the test and its minimum depth coverage, the source of the DNA, 
whether blood or saliva, the density of GC nucleotides, how the se-
quence is chemically enriched before being analyzed, and the method of 
sequencing. 152 These variables will impact how sure we can be that a 
positive or negative finding through WES means anything. 
The ACMG working group anticipated the need for validation when 
it acknowledged that Sanger sequencing or other approaches would 
need to “fill in” with slower and more thorough tests, if the gene were 
being evaluated for a primary diagnosis.153 The working group also 
reiterated that it did not recommend disclosing SFs where the primary 
genetic cause is a structural variant, repeat, or copy-number variant—
because exome sequencing is not a reliable technology for measuring 
these—and the ACMG did not want to recommend “that laboratories 
utilize orthogonal techniques to search for these variants.”154 While the 
disclaimer is necessary, it reveals the false assurance that can stem from 
whole exome sequencing. Namely, a patient might incorrectly assume 
that negative findings means no genetic defects, when in reality they 
might have a series of complex mutations that ACMG just does not  
147. Id. at 213. 
148. Clinical Whole Exome Sequencing Informed Consent, N.Y. GENOME CTR., 
http://www.nygenome.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NYGC-
Clinical-Whole-Exome-Sequencing.pdf (last updated Jan. 27, 2106). 
149. Whole Exome Sequencing, BAYLOR MIRACA, 5, https://www.bc
m.edu/research/medical-genetics-labs/?pmid=22653 (last visited Apr. 4, 
2018). 
150. Id. at 2. 
151. Park, supra note 146, at 220. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Green, supra note 32, at 567. 
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suggest reporting. If it becomes common clinical practice to return SFs, 
patients might expect that a negative means they are “free and clear” 
of genetic risk, when in fact that is not the case.155 
The lack of consensus on reporting false negatives, plus the vari-
ability in rates of false negatives illustrates that the foreseeability 
analysis is not straightforward.156 Laboratories are not casting out per-
fect searches of the haystack, and if they find a needle, they cannot be 
sure this is a real, actual needle. Some of the “needles” found in the SF 
haystack are fake, due to the cheaper, less thorough, exome sequencing. 
And the searches miss lots of needles, too. To run targeted, validated 
genetic tests for each of the fifty-nine ACMG mutations, and any 
additional mutations that predict serious drug reactions, would require 
too much financial and time resources of laboratories. The lack of robust 
analytical validity in the WES context substantially reduces the 
foreseeability of future harm. 
iv. Summary of the Foreseeability Factor Analysis 
Unlike traditional duty-to-warn cases, the risk presented by SFs is 
highly-variable and depends on factors such as genetic penetrance and 
expression. Further, the number of false positives and false negatives 
likely from WGS and WES makes the risk of harm from non-disclosure 
even less likely. This makes it difficult to say that, in the abstract, the 
risk of harm for non-disclosure is foreseeable enough to impose an affir-
mative duty on laboratories to warn patients of SFs. But courts may 
not frame the analysis in this way. 
Courts should analyze foreseeability in the abstract, and not as 
applied to a particular plaintiff. But courts can interpret this “abstract 
duty” a little less abstractly. For example, even in the landmark case 
of Tarasoff, the duty was not an absolute duty to warn anyone of a 
patient’s threats.157 It was limited factually to only warning of serious 
threats to identifiable people. For example, one cannot say that the risk 
of non-disclosure of all SFs is reasonably likely to cause harm.158 If you 
narrow the inquiry to SFs that are disease-causing, highly-penetrant, 
have low variance in expression, and high-analytic validity, then the 
foreseeability of harm is greater. But narrowing the question in this way 
is a much more fact-intensive inquiry, and therefore courts should 
instead focus on the breach-element of breach, rather than the negli-
gence analysis. 
 
155. Id. 
156. Park, supra note 146, at220. 
157. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d 
334, 340 (1976) 
158. Negligence, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/n
egligence (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) and Duty to Warn, supra note 143. 
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But judges might, in some circumstances, find this sort of remote 
harm foreseeable. Judges are human and are vulnerable to subcon-
sciously reframing arguments in favor of an award of damages where 
someone could have prevented a lost chance of a better outcome. It is 
very difficult to draw a sharp line between a preferred abstract inquiry 
and a fact-specific one. Even the most uncontested duty analyses in-
volve fact-finding under the foreseeability prong. But just because a 
harm is conceivable to a particular person does not mean it should be 
foreseeable to a large group of potential defendants ex ante. 
Even if a judge included fact-specific inquiries—such as penetrance, 
expression, and analytic validity of a positive result for a genetic mu-
tation—into her analysis of foreseeability, finding that the risk of harm 
was foreseeable does not end the debate. Foreseeability is the first 
factor, as “[m]any harms are quite literally foreseeable, yet for prag-
matic reasons, no recovery is allowed . . . [a] . . . further inquiry must 
be made . . . .”159 Let us proceed with this further inquiry, and turn to 
the next Rowland factor. 
b. The Second Factor: The Plaintiff Must Have Suffered A Certain, 
Concrete Harm 
The second Rowland factor considers the degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff suffered harm. It imposes a check on liability for intan-
gible—or purely emotional—harms. Courts are reluctant to impose an 
affirmative duty to warn where the harm is not capable of easy measure-
ment or proof.160 Thus, the type of injury alleged matters a great deal. 
In traditional negligence claims, plaintiffs can allege emotional, 
physical, property, or purely-financial damages. But the parties rarely 
litigate the degree of certainty of harm in duty-to-warn cases, because 
the harm that materialized is obvious, such as the murder of Tatiana 
or Rowland’s severed hand tendons.161 Where a plaintiff alleges either 
nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm, 
however, courts will often declare a non-suit because the defendant had 
no duty to warn of these kinds of futuristic or intangible harms.162 
 
159. Munn v. Hotchkiss School, 795 F.3d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 2015). 
160. Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 293 (Cal. 2016) (“The second 
Rowland factor, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, 
‘has been noted primarily, if not exclusively, when the only claimed injury 
is an intangible harm such as emotional distress.’ Courts have occasionally 
included under this factor concerns about the existence of a remedy.”). 
161. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 145; see also Emerich, 720 A.2d at 
1032. 
162. Describing the idea that even where the defendant owes a duty to the 
plaintiff, there must be a cognizable, realized injury to the plaintiff in 
order for recovery in tort. Increasing the risk of harm, or “inchoate” harm, 
is not enough. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1638 (2002). 
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Construction defects makes this concept clear. Courts have found 
that breaches which “have not ripened into property damage, or at least 
into involuntary out-of-pocket losses, do not comfortably fit the 
definition of an ‘appreciable harm’—an essential element of a negligence 
claim.”163 There is no common law negligence suit if construction defects 
have not yet caused a real harm.164 A plaintiff can sue once the pipe 
leaks turns from a potential to an actual injury. As courts have been 
reluctant to impose a duty in cases where the harm is purely emotional 
or financial—without accompanying physical injury to person or 
property—courts might be particularly reluctant to do so when 
expanding affirmative duties to warn.165 
As applied to the genetic-sequencing context, plaintiffs will 
probably be required to demonstrate some present, ripe, cognizable 
injury from the lab’s failure to disclose an SF. If the plaintiff has died 
or incurred significant medical expenses and alleges the defendant’s 
breach caused these injuries, this factor will not prevent recovery. But 
where the plaintiff is still alive and has alleged that she suffered “lost 
chance” of survival due to defendant’s breach or a speculative future 
harm, courts are less likely to impose a duty to warn for this kind of 
intangible, difficult-to-quantify, harm. Typically, the harms must con-
cretely materialize. 
c. The Third Factor: There Must be A Close Connection Between 
Defendant’s Conduct and the Injury Suffered 
Causation—an element independent of negligence—also comes into 
play as the third Rowland factor. Under the analysis of duty, the “close 
connection between defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered” serves 
to further narrow the class of obligations for which the defendant had 
 
163. Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1172 (Cal. (1975); see San Francisco 
Unified School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1327–
1331, [the presence of asbestos products in buildings did not, prior to the 
release of friable asbestos, constitute actual and appreciable harm under 
Davies v. Krasna]. 
164. Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1137–38 (Cal. 2000) (superceded by 
statute to provide a right to sue, acknowledging that the legislature 
needed to impose this duty as it did not exist through common law). The 
general premise still remains, however, that “[t]he mere breach of duty—
causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future 
harm not yet realized—normally does not suffice to create a cause of 
action.” San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal. 
App. 4th 1318, 1326, (1995). For application of the requirement of 
“appreciable harm” for tort recovery in different contexts, see 
Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Fletcher, Tilton & Whipple, P.C., 394 Mass. 
265, 268, (1985). 
165. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. 
L. REV. 1625, 1659-1602 (2002). 
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a duty to warn.166 In our hypothetical case, plaintiffs must prove that 
knowledge of SFs would have probably resulted in different clinical 
treatments, which would have prevented their legally cognizable 
injuries. For example, terminal cancer patients would struggle to estab-
lish a wrongful death claim because it would be hard to prove, given 
their cancer, that they would probably have lived if they had known 
about the SF. Further, not all diseases are treatable or preventable. For 
example, if the SF indicated that the patient was at risk for a type of 
early-onset dementia, then the patient could not show causation 
between a failure to warn and the injury of dementia if the patient 
could not have prevented the dementia from developing or if it were 
treated in a different way. 
If the causation question hinges on the facts of the particular case 
—such as in the case of whether Christian Williams would have been 
treated differently had the VUS been classified as Dravet-causing167—
then the judge should typically let the jury decide whether this satisfies 
the element of causation.168 At least one court has recognized that 
incomplete information about penetrance and the potential success of 
treatment can foreclose summary judgment.169 In Safer v. Estate of Pack, 
New Jersey’s superior court stated: 
we are led to understand from the experts’ reports that the risk 
of multiple polyposis was significant and that, upon detection, an 
early full colectomy, i.e., an excision of her entire colon, may well 
have been the treatment of choice to avoid resultant cancer-
including metastasis, the loss of other organs and the rigors of 
chemotherapy. Full factual development may, however, cast a 
different light on these issues of fact and others.170 
Because causation in this particular case could not be proven, the 
case went to trial.171 
As a class, plaintiffs might argue that a laboratory’s failure to warn 
caused them to miss out on a chance of a good clinical prognosis. But 
if a plaintiff complains of wrongful death instead of a “lost chance,” 
then courts are more likely to find there was no duty to warn. The “lost 
chance” theory first emerged in cases where defendants had duties to 
rescue someone that stood in a close, special relationship to them.172  
166. Watkinson v. MortgageIT, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53540 (S.D. Cal., 
June 1, 2010). 
167. Wagner, supra note 57. 
168. Id. 
169. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1193. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. The Fourth Circuit held that “this view ignores the underlying character 
of the duty. It was less than a duty to rescue him, but it was a positive 
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In a minority of states the theory of lost chance operates to relax 
the standard of causation, where the plaintiff can receive compensation 
even where it is not possible for the plaintiff to prove that she would 
have probably survived in absence of the defendant’s breach.173 But this 
is thought of as an “extreme” position.174 In most states, the “lost 
chance” theory reframes the injury and compensates the degree to 
which the chance of survival was lost.175 Courts typically only allow the 
“lost chance of survival” claim if the defendant breached a duty to fail 
to rescue someone he or she should have or committed medical 
malpractice resulting in the plaintiff’s death.176 
Because imposing a duty to rescue departs from traditional common 
law, it is narrowly circumscribed. Most defendants do not owe a duty 
 
duty to make a sincere attempt at rescue. The duty is of such nature that 
its omission will contribute to cause the seaman’s death. The duty arises 
when there is a reasonable possibility of rescue. . . . [t]herefore, proximate 
cause here is implicit in the breach of duty.” Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk 
Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 1962). 
173. J. Stephen Phillips, The “Lost Chance” Theory of Recovery, Colo. Law. 
85-86 (1998); “In medical malpractice cases involving preexisting medical 
conditions, a majority of jurisdictions have declined to relax the standard 
of causation or create a new compensable injury.” Lisa Perrochet, Lost 
Chance Recovery and the Folly of Expanding Medical Malpractice 
Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 615, 628 (1992). 
174. See DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986) (“[This 
position] effectively allows a jury to speculate on causation because expert 
testimony that a physician’s negligence probably caused the total damages 
is not required. This is an extreme position and clearly distorts the 
traditional principles of causation.”); see also Alice Férot, The Theory of 
Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and Acceptance, 8 F. INT’L U. L REV. 
591, 593-94 (2013) (“Professor King, however, formulated the theory of 
loss in chance in terms of causation and burden of proof, not in terms of 
injury . . . . The loss of chance is not a theory of causation but a theory 
of injury.”). 
175. Watson v. Glenwood Reg’l Med. Ctr., 163 So. 3d 817, 822 (La. Ct. App. 
2015) (“The loss of chance of survival is a distinct compensable injury 
caused by a defendant’s negligence, distinguishable from the loss of life in 
wrongful death cases . . . In short, the lost chance is a separate and 
valuable claim or element of damages, not a distinct cause of action that 
may accrue later than the initial act of malpractice.”). 
176. Pelas v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 1999 WL 438478, at *2 (E.D. La. June 28, 
1999)(“In limiting recovery to medical malpractice cases, the Hardy court 
emphasized the need to restrict the application of the relaxed burden to 
special circumstances such as the patient-physician relationship.” Id. at 
*9 quoting Hardy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 910 P.2d 1024, 1029 
(Okla. 1996)); See also, Férot, supra note 174, at 592 (“In the United 
States, the theory of loss of chance has been implemented mostly in the 
area of medical malpractice. Usually, a patient, or his or her 
representative, will sue a healthcare provider for a failure to diagnose or 
a failure to cure a medical condition that resulted in the diminution of 
the patient’s chance to survive or recover from the condition.”). 
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to rescue or warn plaintiffs in the absence of a pre-existing, special 
relationship with the plaintiff.177 Again, it is the physical custody, 
fiduciary obligation, and vulnerability of the plaintiff vis-à-vis the 
defendant that imposes a duty to rescue upon the defendant.178 For 
example, a ship master should at least attempt to rescue one of his 
seaman because no one else could rescue him and he was put at risk by 
the ship master’s enterprise.179 Once again, this duty is limited to 
rescuing from imminent physical injury, and courts do not auto-
matically analogize from a duty to rescue to a duty to warn.180 While a 
duty to rescue is far more burdensome than a duty to warn, the risk of 
imminent physical injury motivates each duty. 
Courts are disinclined to impose affirmative duties to rescue or 
warn if the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant’s inaction probably 
caused the plaintiff’s injury and the plaintiff did not share a special 
relationship with the defendant.181 Courts adhere rigidly to the typical 
burden of proof with each element because not every injury requires 
compensation from tort law. Some injuries are too intangible and 
distant from defendant’s actions to impose tort liability. Simply that 
an injury may be prevented does not mean the defendant owes a duty 
to prevent it.182 The plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s failure to 
warn was a probable—not just a possible—cause of plaintiff’s injury.183 
The plaintiff would have a much stronger claim against the 
laboratory if the plaintiff suffered a concrete, materialized physical 
injury and can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
laboratory caused her injury by failing to warn her of the SF. To the 
extent a plaintiff alleges “lost chance” of a better outcome and cannot 
prove that her injury would have been averted if the lab had given her 
the SF, the plaintiff would lose in most states. In our case the patient 
is likely already exhibiting symptoms of another disease that is warran-
ting the genetic test. Proving that delayed diagnosis of an SF caused a 
significant lost chance is difficult, though not impossible. A plaintiff 
could easier prove causation if the SF is linked to a more serious disease 
than the disease for which the patient initially sought treatment. Some 
states limit the “lost chance” theory of injury to traditional medical 
malpractice where the defendant-physician breached a standard of care 
 
177. Groninger, supra note 61, at 359. 
178. See id. at 358. 
179. See id. at 360. 
180. Id. at 360. 
181. Id. 
182. See id. at 356. 
183. See Owen, supra note 60, at 1671. 
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by failing to make an important diagnosis.184 Thus, if the plaintiff is 
suing in one of those states, the injury could not be framed as lost 
chance of a better outcome. 
d. The Fourth Factor: The Moral Blame Attached to Defendant’s 
Conduct 
The moral blame attached to a laboratory for failing to return SFs 
or VUS is not as intense as the blame attached to someone who fails to 
warn of imminent, physical injury. Moral blame is particularly fas-
cinating as applied to tort law. The history of tort law is checkered 
when it comes to liability being connected to moral blame.185 The law 
can hold employers liable for the actions of their employees, even when 
they are not at fault in supervising them.186 Similarly, the law might 
hold those with mental illness liable, even where it is impossible for 
them to conform their conduct to the standard tort law requires.187 
Indeed, much of tort law has very little to do with moral wrongfulness. 
But when it comes to expanding liability for the unexpected, courts 
return to the moral blameworthiness of the inaction as a touchstone to 
determine whether a duty to warn exists.188 
It is not easy to assess blame in the abstract, because we tend to 
impose blame somewhat irrationally and based largely upon outcome. 
For example, in the abstract people probably do not expect a laboratory 
to return SFs or VUS, and so long as no one is injured, people will not 
find that the laboratory was blameworthy for failing to return these 
results. But if someone suffers injury, even if the injury was not 
foreseeable, people tend to attribute blame and intentionality to the 
same previously blame-free decision. If the defendant is sued and could 
have prevented the delayed diagnosis, people will attribute some culp-
ability to its decision not to warn. Even if the actor did not anticipate 
the bad outcome, outcome matters a great deal.189 This effect seems to 
 
184. Misdiagnosis and Failure to Diagnose, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/i
njury/medical-malpractice/misdiagnosis-and-failure-to-diagnose/ (last 
visited March 13, 2018). 
185. See generally Christopher Jackson, Tort, Moral Luck, and Blame, 60 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 57, 58 (2012). 
186. Russel G. Thornton, Responsibility for the Act of Others, 23 BAYLOR 
UNIV. MED. CTR. PROC. 313, 313 (2010). 
187. William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally 
Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L. J. 52, 52 (1960). 
188. Thomas J. Murphy, Affirmative Duties in Tort Following Tarasoff, 58 St. 
John’s L. Rev. 492, 527 (2012). 
189. Mark D. Alicke, Blaming Badly, 8 J. COGNITION AND CULTURE 179, 181 
fn. 1 (2008) (“Intentionality judgments are, therefore, susceptible to 
outcome bias, which involves judging an outcome in terms of its 
consequences, independent of the decision-maker’s intentions and the 
causal process by which they were generated.”). 
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work only in one direction; humans blame those who accidentally cause 
harm and attribute intentionality to their actions, but do not praise 
those who accidentally cause a benefit. This is the “praise/blame 
asymmetry” or the “Knobe effect.”190 And it has an impact on tort law. 
As tort scholars Goldberg and Zipursky note, there is a certain 
amount of luck that factors into liability: the careless actor who 
happens not to injure someone pays nothing, but the careless actor who 
unluckily injures someone pays a great deal.191 The law of negligence 
disproportionately punishes those who happen to get unlucky when 
they are careless and juries may infer bad intent or blameworthiness to 
their actions even when there was none. This common practice, and its 
underlying moral philosophy, suggests that jurors will find the labor-
atory morally blameworthy if they knew an SF was pathogenic and 
treatment was available and it failed to warn the patient, even if 
penetrance was low and expression was variable. Or, the laboratory 
could be considered morally blameworthy if it knew the SF related to 
a severe drug reaction and did not pass that information along to the 
patient because the laboratory believed it quite unlikely that the 
patient would ever need the drug. If the patient ever needed the drug, 
the laboratory may have believed that a physician would order the 
relevant genetic test. Another scenario would involve a case like the 
Williams’, where a laboratory designated a mutation of “unknown 
significance,” and the pathogenicity of the mutation was ambiguous.192 
If in hindsight the mutation proved to be pathogenic, a jury might infer 
moral blameworthiness to the lab who legitimately designated the mu-
tation as VUS. But placing blame on the defendant probably only 
occurs when the plaintiff suffers significantly from the non-disclosure. 
Because assessing duty and blame should be decided more abstract-
ly and should apply to many cases with different facts, it seems unlikely 
that the laboratory should be thought of as morally blameworthy for 
failing to warn patients of unforeseeable harms. The plaintiff can make 
a stronger case for moral blameworthiness if the laboratory does not 
share the SFs with the ordering physician it knows to be pathogenic 
and treatable. Even that failure, however, is less blameworthy than the 
failure to warn readily identifiable victims of imminent physical 
violence. If any moral blame exists, it is a small dose aimed at the 
physician who failed to share the results with his or her patient. It is 
aimed less at the lab who failed to share results directly with the 
 
190. The praise/blame asymmetry is widespread; it holds for 4 year olds, Hindi-
speakers, and people with emotional deficits. See, Frank Hindriks, 
Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives, 
29 MIND AND LANGUAGE, 51, 53 (2014). 
191. Goldberg and Zipursky, supra note 165, at1132, 1135. 
192. See Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, 2014 Okla. Dist. LEXIS 394 (7th Dist. 
Oct. 24, 2014). 
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patients. Imposing moral outrage or blame on the lab’s failure to 
disclose SFs likely results from the Knobe effect.193 
Empirical data can provide a sense of our intuition about the 
laboratory’s obligations and likely correlates to how blame would attach 
for failure to meet these obligations. When surveyed, sixty-seven 
percent of genetics professionals believed that health-care providers 
have an obligation to return positive SFs from clinical-exome 
sequencing or whole-genome sequencing for Mendelian diseases.194 Sixty-
one percent thought they should disclose SFs of negative-drug 
interactions, 49 percent thought they should disclose carrier status, 20 
percent thought they should disclose complex traits, and 25 percent 
thought they should not disclose any SFs.195 This population is biased 
because they are sophisticated genetics professionals as opposed to lay 
patients or plaintiffs who would receive the information.196 Nevertheless, 
focus-group studies indicate that most non-African-American partic-
ipants would want “actionable” genetic-WGS results yielding benefits 
such as medical treatment or disease prevention, and “expect and are 
motivated by the ability to use individual genetic information for future 
planning.”197 While some participants self-identified as “planners” who 
want more information for the sake of family-reproductive planning, 
this was not a universal response.198 Some participants did not want to 
know results with likely false-positives or false-negatives because it 
would “cloud” their thinking, might be “too big, too scary” and such 
results might be “paralyzing.”199 These lay-people perspectives render 
non-disclosure much more morally ambiguous, at least in the abstract 
and ex ante. 
The nature of the conveyed information renders non-disclosure 
much less morally blameworthy than in the cases where courts have 
imposed a duty to warn. Namely, a therapist who fails to inform a 
potential victim that one of his patients intends to harm him is more 
morally blameworthy, as is a homeowner who fails to warn a guest of a 
sharp piece of broken porcelain. These cases are unambiguous in terms 
of their moral valence, given the magnitude of the risk of non-disclosure 
 
193. Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 
63 ANALYSIS 190, 194 (2003). 
194. Yu 2014, supra note 31 at 79. 
195. Id. at 84. 
196. Id. at 77.  
197. Joon-Ho Yu, et al., “Attitudes of Non-African American Focus Group 
Participants Toward Return of Results from Exome and Whole Genome 
Sequencing, 95 AM J. HUMAN GENETICS 2153, 2157 (2014) [hereinafter Yu]. 
198. Id. at 5-6. 
199. Yu, supra note 197, at 2156. 
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as compared with the risk of unnecessarily worrying the victim. With 
the return of SFs, the risk is more equivocal because there is a pos-
sibility of future harm from non-disclosure, but also a possibility of 
harm from disclosure, and the risk is much less imminent. Because the 
would-be patients disagree about whether they ought to have this 
information communicated to them, the tort “duty to warn” stands on 
a shaky moral ground. 
e. The Fifth Factor: The Policy of Preventing Future Harm 
The policy of preventing future harm is the next Rowland factor. 
While not every preventable harm imposes a tort obligation to do so, 
this factor weighs into the calculation. It also relates to the other factors 
of foreseeability, moral blame, and causation. But rather than looking 
at particular cases and arguing whether a warning could prevent harm 
in a specific instance, the “policy of prevention” factor considers the 
abstract social perspective and looks at net harms prevented. The quest-
ion becomes whether the policy of imposing a duty to warn in general 
and on average—prevents future harms.200  
When it comes to disease-causing SFs, there is a good, but weaker 
claim for disclosure on prevention grounds. It might be difficult to prove 
that a patient would have pursued a different treatment had she had 
known about her SF or that the non-disclosure caused her injury. But 
in the aggregate, knowledge of SFs would lead to better clinical 
outcomes if the patient can recall the SF when necessary. Despite the 
significant risks of false positives and false negatives—and the 
possibility of psychological stress or false assurances—the more concrete 
harm is the injury from a delayed diagnosis, such as medical expenses 
and a premature death, that could be averted. And it is this injury 
which could be prevented by requiring labs to disclose clinically action-
able SFs. 
Again prevention of future harm depends on the type of duty 
alleged. In terms of prevention, the case for disclosing adverse-drug 
genotypes is perhaps the strongest, given that the patient might be 
offered a drug, she could refuse, given with knowledge of her a SF. It 
might not be foreseeable that she would ever need the particular drug, 
but there is a strong argument that had she been told of this particular 
SF, she could have avoided a serious reaction if she ever needed the 
drug in the future. But this assumes that the patient would remember 
the SF and recall it when offered that drug in the future. It assumes 
that her physician would have entered the SF into her medical record 
for future use. Both of these situations are plausible, if not certain. 
Many of serious adverse drug events could be prevented if patients were 
warned of their SFs. 
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While the ACMG does not recommend returning pharmaco-
genomics SFs,201 laboratories may have a greater tort duty to warn of 
potentially fatal drug side effects that could be predicted by someone’s 
genetics because of the improved ability to prevent a concrete harm. 
Even though the foreseeability of harm varies based on penetrance and 
the complexity of genetics, some single, rare mutations predict severe 
drug reactions, as discussed above with the use of abacavir in patients 
with particular HLA-B mutations.202 When a laboratory knows of these 
mutations, and the individual takes the proscribed drug, the foresee-
ability of harm is likely and could lead to death.203 
This still assumes that laboratories would share the information in 
a way that makes sense to the patient, that the patient remembered it, 
and could recall it when necessary. Even so, because these plaintiffs 
could demonstrate that they would have remembered their SF and 
would have done something different regarding their health, they can 
show that disclosure would prevent future harm. The disclosure of 
information could be used in many clinical ways that are quite thought-
ful and deliberate, including future generation’s reproductive plan-
ing.204 It is therefore possible to say that knowledge of the SF could 
prevent aggregate future harms from delayed diagnosis or drug inter-
actions. Indeed, this factor might favor return of SFs than it was in 
Rowland and Tarasoff. 
Empirical data published following the Tarasoff case demonstrated 
that this factor could have made the court move in a different dir-
ection.205 Therapists are not particularly good at predicting when 
violence is imminent, and given the nature of the risk—serious physical 
violence, which could occur at any time—a warning does not usually 
prevent the harm.206 Even if Tatiana Tarasoff had been warned of her 
murderer’s plot, short of staying home on house arrest for her life, the 
warning could not have kept her murderer away. This strikes a huge 
blow to imposing a duty and calls into question the plaintiff’s ability to 
prove causation. If a warning will not prevent harm, then imposing a  
201. Orli G. Bahcall, ACMG Guides on the Interpretation of Sequence 
Variants, 16 NATURE REV. GENETICS 256, 256 (2015). 
202. Sources cited supra notes 138-141 (discussing HIV and HLBA). 
203. Zhang, supra note 132, at 76. 
204. If the claim is “lost chance to terminate a pregnancy” courts are much 
less willing to entertain this claim than if it is framed as a “lost chance to 
employ genetic screening devices” to select particular embryos for 
implantation. Simmons v. W. Covina Med. Clinic, 260 Cal. Rptr. 722, 
776-77, (Ct. App. 1989). 
205. Toni Pryor Wise, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psycho-
therapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STANFORD L. REV. 165, 
186-187 (1978); Douglas Mossman, The Imperfection of Protection 
Through Detection and Intervention¸ 30 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 133 (2009). 
206. Wise, supra note 205, at 187; Mossman, supra note 205, at 133. 
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duty may be motivated too much by moral outrage and a desire to hold 
someone accountable, rather than on typical negligence grounds. 
f. The Sixth Factor: The Potential Resource Burden on Labs 
Many of the Rowland factors mimic the rubric the ACMG working 
group used to determine which SFs laboratories should routinely 
disclose.207 This is not surprising, because the elements of negligence 
mirror cost-benefit assumptions about how we should hold those who 
engage in careless behavior accountable. But there is a key difference 
between the ACMG criteria for disclosure and the Rowland criteria. 
Tort law recognizes that while there might be an ethical obligation to 
warn, there might not be a legal one if the burden of warning is too 
great.208 Courts should consider whether imposing this duty will cost 
the defendants too much time or money, relative to the risk being 
prevented. 
If the duty to warn is framed in terms of merely having to provide 
the ordering physician with clinically actionable, validated pathogenic 
SFs that were already analyzed, along with some basic interpretive 
information, this is not likely to be too burdensome. Indeed, courts will 
likely see this burden as commensurate with any preventable risk, given 
that the burden is merely passing along already-gathered results.209 This 
is analogous to asking a physician to report an incidental finding of a 
liver tumor the physician detected when he or she ordered a stomach 
X-ray. To reduce the risk of undue psychological distress on the patient, 
the physician must then place the results in context, including for the 
patient. This includes communicating with the patient the need for 
confirmation testing. In the context of genetic sequencing, it would be 
inappropriate for the laboratory to assume a duty to place the results 
in context for the patient whom they have never met and likely never 
will because the laboratory has no special relationship with the patient. 
Thus, if framed in terms of needing to disclose SFs to the ordering 
provider, there is a good case for this duty to be imposed, assuming 
that the risk of harm is foreseeable and significant. 
If, however, the lab is expected to: investigate public or medical 
records to find contact information for the patient, contact the patient 
and reveal the presence of the SF, follow-up with clinical referrals, pay 
for additional sequencing methods to confirm the presence of the SF, 
request samples from the patients and then test those samples to 
determine the spontaneity or heritability of the mutation, and run 
contemporaneous literature-review searches after every test to ensure 
current classifications of SFs, then these are too great of burdens to 
 
207. Kalia, supra note 40, at 249. 
208. PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION, AND THE LAW, 74 
(2013). 
209. See Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). 
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impose. Like all of the Rowland factors, this evaluation is a judgment 
call. Courts could reach different conclusions, depending on how they 
weigh the benefits of prevention and the burdens of disclosure. But if 
courts take seriously the balancing of benefits and costs of imposing 
this duty and consider early duty-to-warn cases, courts should not 
impose any duty on a laboratory to directly contact patients with 
clinically ambiguous SFs. 
Based on personal conversations with lab directors, it is clear that 
some labs voluntarily undertake to do more than what the law requires. 
But as more patients submit samples for WES or WGS, the frequency 
of these scenarios will be too great for laboratories to incur their cost. 
Laboratories test patients and run ad hoc literature reviews on genetic 
tests because the volume is not too great.210 But this will not be scale-
able, absent future insurance reimbursement for this sort of task. 
g. The Seventh Factor: The Lack of Insurance to Spread the Cost of 
Imposing a Duty 
The Rowland court included a final factor that assessed the cost, 
prevalence and availability of insurance to mitigate the risk.211 If the 
defendant could purchase insurance—say, such as renter’s insurance as 
Christian did in the Rowland case itself, or liability insurance in 
malpractice cases—to absorb some of the cost of resulting injuries, 
courts should be more inclined to impose a duty.212 But if a considerable 
portion of the injury comes from pain and suffering damages that the 
plaintiff cannot cover through insurance or if there is no real way of 
limiting the defendant’s exposure, then this factor mitigates against 
imposing a duty.213 If the potential for liability is too vast, then the 
burden on defendants will be too great to justify. The few courts to 
directly address this factor have emphasized that the liability must have 
some limits, so that defendants do not become bankrupt and are not 
“priced out” of buying insurance in the future.214 
If clinical laboratories have a duty to warn patients of SFs, it is 
unclear who would pay for this burden and the resulting injuries upon 
breach of that duty. Currently, clinical laboratories likely do not have 
adequate liability insurance to cover the cost of failure-to-warn 
lawsuits. This is a new conception of a legal duty, likely not built into 
 
210. Lidia Feliubadolo et al., Benchmarking of Whole Exome Sequencing and 
Ad Hoc Designed Panels for Genetic Testing of Hereditary Cancer, SCI. 
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213. See Kesner v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 4th 251, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2014) superceeded by Kesner v. S.C. (Pneumo Abex LLC), 331 P.3d 179 
(Cal. 2014) vacated, Kesner v. S. C., 384 P.3d 283 (Cal. 2016). 
214. See Kesner v. S. C., 384 P.3d 283, 296 (Cal. 2016). 
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existing policies. If courts impose this duty, insurance markets might 
begin to provide this coverage, but it will be difficult to price as whole-
exome sequencing is only just beginning in the clinical sphere. Liability 
exposure could be vast if damages extend beyond SFs likely to cause 
foreseeable, severe harm. Of course, a first-of-its-kind high profile case 
with a pediatric patient who was killed, due to unreported SFs, and 
who might not have been had the lab reported different data, might be 
enough to steer this litigation in the wrong direction. While courts have 
imposed liability on laboratories for mishandling or improperly 
classifying results or omitting key findings, the return of SFs presents 
a novel duty that insurance providers have not yet incorporated into 
their policies. 
This factor typically addresses the availability of insurance to cover 
the defendant industry’s liability. But given the role that the plaintiff’s 
medical-insurance plays in reducing the financial cost of compliance for 
defendants, it is worth mentioning how insurance covers genetic tests, 
which could also have been analyzed under the previous factor “burden 
on defendants.” Insurance coverage for WES and WGS is spotty.215 
Even when patients have positive-disease symptoms and look for a 
related genotype, insurance coverage for genetic tests is “uncertain.”216 
The billing director for Ambry Genetics—the first commercial lab to 
offer whole exome sequencing—said insurance coverage is “all over the 
map.”217 
Genetic tests are sometimes paid for as part of an inpatient 
hospitalization when patients have a debilitating disorder and are 
looking for the genetic cause. 218 Otherwise, genetic testing for a present 
disorder is paid partly by insurance and partly by the patient. If the 
patient is an outpatient, in some cases, the ordering physician chooses 
the clinical laboratory based on “out-of-pocket expense to patients by 
comparing the costs between laboratories based on patients’ insur-
ance.”219 
The argument for insurance coverage is greater when someone is on 
a diagnostic odyssey, because present clinical need motivates the test. 
In our case, paying for follow-up tests to assess the clinical validity of 
a potentially significant SF has a much more attenuated connection to 
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present clinical care. Therefore, insurance is even less likely to cover it. 
As a senior medical director for Aetna insurance stated in 2014, some 
of whole-genome sequencing is still in the “early stages” of analytic and 
clinical validity.220 Currently, the lack of standards on ensuring quality 
control, interpreting, and validating results makes it unlikely private 
insurers will cover this test.221 Medicare does not.222 While some insur-
ance companies—even Medicaid—may initially cover genetic testing for 
patients on diagnostic odysseys, this is due to the low volume of 
requests.223 Scant private coverage may subsidize the many claims 
insurers deny. But, “[a]s use of the new technology has grown, a number 
of insurers, including Blue Cross Blue Shield, have reacted by putting 
the brakes on reimbursement.”224 Dr. Allen Bale is the director of the 
DNA Diagnostic Lab at Yale School of Medicine. Since 2011, he has 
seen a 500 percent increase in orders for exome sequencing.225 
Two major health plans have started developing policies for future 
coverage, but currently deny most requests due to the “experimental 
and unproven” nature of WES and WGS.226 As with all insurance 
coverage decisions, future coverage depends on the extent to which the 
results of the testing are analytically and clinically valid and clinically 
actionable.227 If the information translates into a “measured improved 
health outcome,” insurance will more likely cover these tests.228 But 
insurers will probably restrict coverage for WES and WGS to “patients 
with disorders of suspected genetic etiology but no obvious diagnosis,” 
and “patients with a suspected diagnosis that could involve one or more 
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2005), https://www.genome.gov/17516574/the-future-of-genomic- medici
ne-policy-implications-for-research-and-medicine/. 
227. Steenhuysen, supra note 16. 
228. GeneWatch, supra note 221. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Needles, Haystacks and Next-Generation Genetic Sequencing 
260 
genes.”229 So insurance will not routinely cover the cost of a follow-up 
test to confirm the presence of an SF because it is not pursued due to 
a present health disorder.230 Without a test to confirm existence of an 
SF, the SF may not be clinically actionable due to the poor analytic 
validity of WES and WGS. 
The absence of adequate liability insurance, the potential for vast 
liability for intangible harm, and the unavailability of reimbursement 
from the plaintiff’s health insurance mitigate against imposing a duty 
to warn on laboratories. While future laboratory professional insurance 
might cover this litigation, it is the present availability of insurance 
that matters. If imposing a duty requires insurance coverage to expand, 
this suggests the duty is too burdensome and does not respond to a 
foreseeable and presently insurable risk. 
VII. To Whom Would the Duty Be Owed? 
Even if the law imposed a duty to warn on laboratories, to whom 
would the laboratory owe a duty? While the precise individual need not 
be named, courts have limited the duty to warn to “readily identifiable” 
individuals.231 In Thompson v. County of Alameda, a juvenile delinquent 
murdered a child after his release from a county-correctional facility.232 
The victim’s parents brought a wrongful death action against the 
county, claiming that it should have warned them, the local police, or 
“parents . . . within the immediate vicinity of the juvenile’s residence” 
of a potentially violent offender’s release.233 The court found that the 
county did not have a duty to warn these groups because “the duty to 
warn depends upon and arises from the existence of a prior threat to a 
specific identifiable victim.”234 In this case, the juvenile delinquent’s 
threats were non-specific and the court declined to impose upon the 
county an affirmative duty to warn such a “large amorphous public 
group of potential targets.”235 Many state courts have agreed, requiring 
specific threats against readily identifiable victims before a duty 
arises.236 As one Ohio court put it, “the ‘readily identifiable victim’ rule 
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is born, lives, and grows in failure-to-warn cases.”237And a Minnesota 
court further clarified that the “duty to warn is not owed to statistically 
probable victims, but rather to specifically targeted victims.”238 A 
Florida court extended the duty to a third party where the court—in 
evaluating the risk of genetic disease—found that where a physician’s 
obligations runs to people other than the patient and the physician 
“knows of the existence of those third parties, then the physician’s duty 
runs to those third parties.”239 
While some courts require that the perpetrator specifically name 
the intended victim to impose a duty to warn them, not every state 
follows this law.240 But the courts hold firm to the concept of foresee-
ability; the narrow class of persons to be warned must be foreseeable 
and reasonably identifiable, even if the ultimate plaintiff has not 
already been individually identified.241 Thus, in Alaska the high court 
wrote that “we see no reason to predicate liability wholly on the state’s 
ability to predict the victim’s name. A victim may be ‘foreseeable’ 
without being specifically identifiable.”242 
Courts have applied the same reasoning outside of the context of 
warning of violent offenders. In a case where the plaintiff claims the 
defendant should have warned plaintiff that having sex with his wife—
who was having an affair with defendant—could lead him to acquire a 
sexually-transmitted disease, the court found that a spouse was a 
foreseeable plaintiff and so a duty to warn was created.243 But the court 
cautioned that the law will not impose liability on a defendant related 
“to any and all persons with whom she may have sexual contact.”244 
The duty to warn extends only to those individuals who are reasonably 
foreseeable. 
In the context of SFs, this suggests that laboratories should not 
have to spend a great deal of time or resources identifying the patients 
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or relatives of patients. While courts are willing to impose greater 
burdens on defendants to warn third parties of imminent, physical 
violence, courts are not as likely to require laboratories to re-contact 
the patient for the telephone numbers and names of the patient’s 
relatives, to disclose a non-imminent risk. Would the lab need to search 
the family history records of the patient to find contact information for 
relatives? This also seems to require too much legwork and human 
resources to be considered “readily identifiable,” given that the law 
would expect the laboratory to do this for every person who submits a 
tissue sample and receives an SF. 
VIII. Patient Confidentiality Should Not Be 
Breached When There is No Risk of Imminent Physical 
Violence 
Because of patient privacy—protected through the common law 
and state and federal statutes like HIPAA—the laboratory must ensure 
that if they disclose SFs to patients or relatives, it does not violate the 
patient’s privacy or confidentiality.245 One early court that dealt with 
the duty to warn of heritable diseases transferred the duty to the 
patient (in genetics, the reference patient is called the “proband.”)246 In 
Pate v. Threlkel, the court found that the provider discharges his duty 
to warn non-patients through informing the proband—with a recom-
mendation that he pass the risk information along to the at-risk third 
party.247 Because “the patient ordinarily can be expected to pass on the 
warning,” the physician does not need to tell the third-party relatives 
themselves of a genetic mutation.248 In so holding, the court instructed 
that requiring physicians to: 
seek out and warn various members of the patient’s family would 
often be difficult or impractical and would place too heavy a 
burden upon the physician. Thus, we emphasize that in any 
circumstances in which the physician has a duty to warn of a 
genetically transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by 
warning the patient.249 
Of course, this makes several inappropriate assumptions. First, it 
assumes that the family dynamics are healthy and that communication 
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lines are open. Second, it assumes that the proband will correctly pass 
along the information, with the appropriate clinical suggestions for 
follow-up. But in some families, the proband cannot be expected to 
accurately pass along the warning.250 
In Safer v. Estate of Pack, the New Jersey court analogized 
imposing a duty to warn of genetic risks to a duty to warn of serious 
infectious diseases.251 Safer held that while imposing broad duties to 
non-patients might lead to confusion or unfairness, in the case of 
warning of “avertible risk from genetic causes, by definition a matter of 
familial concern” the burden is narrow enough to be workable and 
just.252 
The court further held that the “duty “extend[s] beyond the 
interests of a patient to members of the immediate family of the patient 
who may be adversely affected by a breach of that duty.”253 In Safer, 
the duty to the non-patient relative was considered discharged by 
informing the patient of the risk, and assuming that the patient would 
share this information with his relative. However, the court reserved 
the possibility of one day breaching a proband’s confidentiality to warn 
a non-patient, if there were some indication the patient would not tell 
their relative.254 
 
250. Studies have found that positive test results are more likely to be disclosed 
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Whether breaching a patient’s common-law confidentiality pro-
tections is justified requires the law to balance competing interests.255 
Recall that in Tarasoff, the defendant-psychotherapist did not directly 
warn Tatiana Tarasoff because he feared breaching his patient’s right 
to privacy.256 The court famously stated that “the public policy favoring 
protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist 
communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential 
to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public 
peril begins.”257 Thus, when it comes to the duty of psychotherapists to 
warn third-parties, the law should balance confidentiality against public 
safety, and public safety is paramount. But risks of non-disclosure of 
SFs are much less imminent and severe, suggesting that the balance 
might tilt in favor of respecting common-law confidentiality.258 
Physicians and laboratories should also ensure that they do not 
violate the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule or other state-privacy statutes. 
Rather than pointing to their patient’s genetic mutation as the basis 
for the disclosure to a relative, providers could simply state that “it has 
come to our attention that you might be at risk for a genetic mutation, 
and if you would like more information, you will need to follow-up with 
your primary care provider.” But patients may not heed this sort of 
vague warning, and thus, it may not prevent future harm. 
Because this sort of disclosure is likely too imprecise to be helpful, 
providers might avail themselves of an HIPAA Privacy Rule’s public-
safety exception. But the “public safety” exception will not work 
because it only allows disclosure of protected health information to 
“avert a serious threat to health or safety” such as the type of risk 
present in the Tarasoff case.259 A physician might disclose protected-
health information if she believes, in good faith, that the disclosure is 
“necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the 
health or safety of a person or the public”; and “is to a person or persons 
reasonably able to prevent or lessen the threat.”260 Where the risk is of 
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imminently contracting contagious disease, courts may require phy-
sicians to breach confidentiality and warn family members that the 
patient is contagious.261 
But the problem is of course, with the word “imminent.” Even if 
the genetic disease is serious and treatment is effective and available, a 
court should not allow disclosure of genetic risks under this exception. 
As Mark Rothstein has pointed out, “imminence” is a high bar; it 
“implies such immediacy that many mental health professionals might 
believe that even a deeply troubled and dangerous person who made 
credible threats did not expressly indicate that he or she was planning 
to take imminent action to carry out the threats.”262 Though there is 
not much case law, disclosure is inappropriate unless the risk was of 
serious, imminent physical violence.263 Defendants should only breach 
confidentiality when the risk is an imminent one.264 Under this standard, 
even highly-penetrant and serious genetic diseases are not imminent 
enough to warrant disclosure. 
Is there an alternative route for disclosure that complies with 
HIPAA? One possibility is not obvious, but relies on the ordinary 
treatment exception.265 The HIPAA privacy rule allows a covered entity 
to disclose PHI “for its own treatment” or “for treatment activities of 
a health care provider.”266 But the regulations do not specify for whom 
the treatment must be intended.267 It might come as a surprise to many 
that the plain-language reading of HIPAA regulations may permit the 
disclosure of a proband’s PHI to treat the proband’s first-degree 
relative.268 The disclosure cannot be merely in the form of a warning, 
but must be part of the relative’s treatment plan. 
Because laboratories could disclose an SF for treatment purposes, 
HIPAA may not create the anticipated hurdles to disclosure. But there 
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is still the possibility of tort liability for public-disclosure of private 
facts if the physician discloses the proband’s non-imminent risk. As the 
only cases to require a breach of confidentiality involved specific threats 
of imminent physical violence, judges should not require a breach of 
common-law privacy principles where the warning is limited to a 
potential for future genetic disease.269 
Given the family dynamics, emotions, and lack of provider-patient 
relationship between the laboratory and the proband’s relative, it would 
be reasonable to consider the physician or laboratory to have discharged 
their tort duty once they inform the proband—or ordering physician—
of the risk, with a commendation from the provider that he or she 
should tell their family members. If the provider informs the proband 
that the risk is genetic and instructs the proband to warn close family 
members, laboratories and providers should not breach the proband’s 
common-law confidentiality rights and reach out to the proband’s 
relative. The provider and the proband is better-positioned to know 
how to inform the relative. 
Most probands do share genetic test results with first-degree 
relatives, so the ordering physician may presume this.270 But the likely-
hood of disclosing to family depends on individual variables such as 
gender, education, family history of cancer, and psychological feelings 
of self-efficacy and optimism.271 And 10.5 percent of relatives who 
learned of their proband’s genetic results could not remember the result 
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later. This group was much more likely to be male.272 If the provider 
has reason to believe that the proband will not tell their relatives about 
a SF linked to highly penetrant colon cancer —perhaps because the 
proband is male and is not optimistic about cancer treatment—then 
the provider, but not the laboratory, might have an obligation to warn 
the proband’s readily identifiable relatives based upon the “special 
relationship” recognized between physicians and patients. But because 
there is no special relationship between the laboratory and the proband, 
it seems hard to stretch that arms-length relationship to require that 
the laboratory do more than disclose SFs to the ordering physician or 
the proband. 
Genetic-risk information is not like imminent-violence-risk infor-
mation or the risk of injuring oneself. Almost anyone would welcome a 
warning that they are at risk of serious, imminent violence or injury. 
No rational person desires to be shot or cut. But not everyone wants to 
know if they are at risk of an uncertain genetic disease. Even if there is 
a well-tolerated treatment available, a non-trivial number of people 
would not want to know of this distant threat.273 Judges should not 
require a breach of patient confidentiality when there is not the kind of 
serious peril to public safety at issue in Tarasoff.274 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Rowland factors are not dissimilar from the ACMG working 
group’s criteria on SFs, or even from the factors insurance companies 
use to determine whether to cover genetic tests.275 Each asks whether 
the cost is worth the benefit. The factors can determine whether, on 
average, imposing a duty to warn on a laboratory strikes the right 
balance of fairness between the defendant’s need-to-pay and the 
plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation. 
Compared to the more traditional duty-to-warn cases, the case for 
laboratories directly warning plaintiffs of SFs is far weaker. First, 
laboratories have no special relationship with patients seeking WES or  
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WGS for an unrelated disease. Second, a physician—with whom the 
patient does have a special relationship and for whom liability for non-
disclosure is more appropriate—mediates the results. Of course, it 
might be precisely because patients are looking to sue someone other 
than their physician that they file a complaint against the laboratory. 
When something goes wrong and the patient is injured, the laboratory 
provides an option to hold an entity accountable, especially when the 
physician, who may have also made a mistake, is a friend. But it is 
precisely because the laboratory is removed from the patient’s direct 
experience that the law should not hold it accountable to the same 
degree as the ordering physician. While liability for failing to follow-up 
on an actionable SF could attach to the physician, liability for the 
laboratory makes much less sense. 
We currently have limited information on the likelihood that a 
monogenic mutation will develop into disease, and the information we 
have likely inflates this value for those who are symptom-free. Thus, 
presence of a genetic mutation does not predict the kind of foreseeable, 
imminent, and serious risk giving rise to a common-law duty to warn 
for laboratories. Additionally, it would be asking too much for courts 
to expect laboratories to internalize the costs of this new duty. The labs 
are likely not insured for this risk and have no means to bill for the 
additional resources it would take to ensure results are valid and 
correctly interpreted. The difficulty proving causation for a concrete 
injury also mitigates against imposing a tort duty to warn as a matter 
of law.276 Given the ambiguous nature of an SF from WES or WGS, it 
is preferable to have any SFs delivered by an ordering physician and in 
the context of clinical care. To impose liability on a laboratory to 
directly warn its patients would engage in the tempting imposition of 
tort obligations where harms are conceivable ex ante, but hardly 
reasonably foreseeable. Currently, the significant cost burden on 
defendants further mitigates against imposing on genetics laboratories 
a duty to warn patients of their SFs. 
 
 
276. David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. 
REV. 1335, 1343 (1992). 
